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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2001, approximately $7 trillion in market value vanished almost
overnight.' When the fraud perpetuated by such established companies as
Enron, Tyco and WorldCom became public knowledge, the stock market
plunged, and shareholders wondered how such deceptions could occur
without their knowledge. In response to this "corporate crime wave,"
President Bush placed the blame for these offenses on dishonest corporate
1. See PUBLIC CITIZEN'S CONGRESS WATCH, HOW THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION HAS STALLED
A MAJOR CORPORATE REFORM AND PLACED THE INTERESTS OF DONORS OVER THE NATION'S
INVESTORS 2, 3 (2004) (citing William H. Donaldson, Corporate Governance: What Has Happened
and Where We Need to Go, BUS. ECON., July 1, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouseforsale.org/documents/1027corp-rpt.pdf [hereinafter CONGRESS WATCH].
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management. 2 "We've got thousands of citizens who own shares of publicly
held companies, many in pension plans, mutual funds, a lot of them direct
ownership," President Bush stated during an address on corporate
responsibility.3 "And this country must hold CEOs-CEOs of publicly held
companies, to the highest of high standards." 4
President Bush's words captured the feelings of the public. Corporate
scandals in reputable companies shook investors' faith in corporate
management-the very individuals who are employed to look after
shareholders' interests.5 Major corporations, which investors previously
thought could do no wrong, engaged in a pattern of behavior that led to
egregious losses of money. Executives operated without board intervention,
"bankrupting their companies and leaving shareholders with nearly
worthless stock.",6  While very few companies were victimized by such
wrongdoing, all public issuers were left with a negative image.7 These
crises emphasized the importance of good board performance, and corporate
governance of public issuers of securities became the focus of attention.8
Activist shareholders demanded a greater role in corporate governance; 9
specifically, allowing investors a greater say in the election of directors.'I
Under current U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") rules,
shareholders are given an opportunity to vote only on those candidates
nominated by the company. II Shareholders can nominate candidates to
replace incumbent directors, but they cannot include their nominee's name
on the company's official proxy, which lists only the company's
2. Id. (citing Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Reiterates Call
for Corporate Responsibility (Mar. 8, 2002)).
3. Id. (citing Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Reiterates Call
for Corporate Responsibility (Mar. 8, 2002)).
4. Id. (citing Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Reiterates Call
for Corporate Responsibility (Mar. 8, 2002)).
5. Deborah Solomon & Joann S. Lublin, Voting Rights: Democracy Looks for an Opening-In
the Boardroom --- SEC Plan to Boost the Role of Investors in Elections Draws Ire of Companies ---
A 1932 Book Foretold Abuses, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2004, at Al.
6. Judith Bums, Corporate Governance (A Special Report): Everything You Wanted to Know
About Corporate Governance ...... But Didn't Know to Ask, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at R6.
7. Teresa Camell & James J. Hanks, Jr., Shareholder Voting and Proxy Solicitation: The
Fundamentals, 37 MD. B.J. 23, 23 (Jan./Feb. 2004).
8. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUs. LAW. 43, 44
(2003).
9. JOHN F. OLSON & JAMES J. MOLONEY, SEC PROXY/SOLICITATION RULES § 10.13 (Supp.
2005).
10. Solomon & Lublin, supra note 5.
11. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,626, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,786 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274).
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candidates. 12 In order to wage an election contest with the corporation's
nominees, a shareholder's proposed slate must "be mailed separately to all
investors."'" This method can require substantial expenditure by the
investor, who must prepare and distribute proxy materials that comply with
the SEC's proxy rules.' 4 Shareholders are left with little opportunity to
actively participate in the nomination process.
After taking into consideration views expressed by commentators, the
SEC Division of Corporation Finance ("Division") recommended changes to
the proxy rules related to the nomination and election of directors.' 5 The
Division stated that the "fundamental problem with American corporate
governance" is that directors and managers of corporations are insufficiently
responsive to shareholders. 16  Two years after the string of corporate
governance failures, the SEC proposed the Security Holder Director
Nomination Rule, anticipated to make directors more receptive to the needs
and demands of shareholders. 7
The proposed Security Holder Director Nomination Rule ("proposed
rule") 8 "would apply in those instances where evidence suggests that the
company has been unresponsive to security holder concerns as they relate to
the proxy process."' 9 Under certain circumstances, the proposed rule would
12. Deborah Solomon, Deals & Deal Makers: SEC Proposes Giving Holders More Clout in
Picking Directors, WALL ST. J., July 16,2003, at C5.
13. Id.
14. SEC, BRIEFING PAPER FOR ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION ON THE PROPOSED SECURITY HOLDER
DIRECTOR NOMINATIONS RULE (Feb. 25, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dir-nominations/dir-
nom-briefing.htm [hereinafter BRIEFING PAPER]. California State Treasurer Philip Angelides
remarked that investors "currently have a pool tax on any shareholder that wants to participate in the
corporate electoral process because it takes hundreds-if not millions-of dollars to contest these
elections." Alison Carpenter & Rachel McTague, Investors, Companies Pump Up Volume On SEC
Shareholder Access Draft Proposals, 1 CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY REP. (BNA) 948, 948 (2003).
15. Damon A. Silvers & Michael I. Garland, The Origins and Goals of the Fight for Proxy
Access, in SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE CORPORATE BALLOT (Lucian Bebchuk, ed., forthcoming
June 2006) (manuscript at 5-6, available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dir-
nominations/silversgarland022004.pdf).
16. Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company's Proxy: An Idea
Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67, 67 (2003).
17. Deborah Solomon, SEC May Boost Holders' Power to Nominate, Elect Directors, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 9, 2003, at C12. "Board unresponsiveness is sometimes tied to governance weaknesses,"
said then SEC Chairman William Donaldson. Id. "This will give shareholders a more important
voice." Id.
18. The rule, if passed, will become Rule 14a-ll of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,626, Investment Company
Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,784 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274).
19. Id.
require companies to include shareholder nominees for director elections in
their proxy materials.20 These circumstances include "the occurrence of one
or both of the nomination procedure triggering events.' The first
triggering event would occur if at least one of a company's nominees for
director "received 'withhold' votes from more than 35% of the votes cast at
an annual" shareholders' meeting. 22 The second triggering event would
occur if a shareholder submitted a proposal pursuant to Rule 14a-8 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 providing that the company become
subject to the proposed rule, which later received more than 50% of votes
cast on the proposal at a shareholders' meeting.23 When one or both of these
triggering events occur, a shareholder may submit a nominee for inclusion in
the company's proxy materials if the shareholder (or shareholder group)
beneficially owns more than 5% of the company's outstanding securities
"continuously for at least two years as of the date of nomination" and
continues to own the securities through the date of the annual shareholders'
24meeting.
The passage of the proposed rule would "be one of the SEC's most
significant rulemakings in years. 25 If shareholders win the right to include
their nominees on the company's proxy, the nature of election contests could
change dramatically. This proposal provides a different alternative to what
shareholders had previously viewed as a "symbolic election of directors,
who typically run unopposed and are assured of victory" in some states by a
"plurality" of a single vote.26
20. Id.
21. Id. at 60,789.
22. Id. (internal citation omitted).
23. Id. at 60,789-90.
24. Dennis Garris et al., SEC Issues Proposed Rules Mandating Shareholder Access to Proxies, 7
M&A LAW. 25, 27 (2003).
25. Id. at 25.
26. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, 2004 POSTSEASON REPORT 5 (2004).
Shareholders may nominate board candidates by either a majority or a plurality vote. See generally
Patty M. DeGaetano, The Shareholder Direct Access Teeter-Totter: Will Increased Shareholder
Voice in the Direct Nomination Process Protect Investors?, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 361, 390-91 (2005)
(discussing the difference in effect of a withheld vote in each type of vote). A candidate is elected
under a majority vote if he or she receives support from a majority of shareholders eligible to vote.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2B-7.28(a) (2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-107-206(1) (2003); MD. CODE
ANN., FIN. INST. § 7-109(e) (LexisNexis 2003). Under plurality voting, on the other hand, the
nominee who receives the most votes is elected. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 60,786 n.52. If there are no more candidates than available board positions, each candidate
will be elected to the board, regardless of whether they received a majority of votes or only one vote.
Id.; see, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 708 (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2004); N.Y. BUS.
CORP. LAW § 614(a) (McKinney 2003); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.28(a) (1984). Companies
largely use plurality voting for director elections. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 60,789.
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Investors have greatly anticipated this proposed rule, and lobbying
efforts to shape it began soon after the SEC requested public comment in
April 2003.27 While most of the comments received by the SEC have been
in favor of proxy rule reform and of the proposed rule, opponents claim that
there are sound legal and policy grounds for opposing the proposal.28
The SEC favors giving shareholders more power, but it is still trying to
determine exactly how to do that. It is deciding which triggering events
shareholder access to the proxy statement would require and whether there
should be "eligibility requirements to nominate a candidate., 29 The SEC is
also considering other alternatives, such as allowing shareholders and boards
to reach a decision about the nomination together.30
Although currently there is a great deal of discussion about the proposed
rule, increased shareholder participation in the election of corporate directors
has been a "topic of interest and debate" for the past sixty years,31 arising
with vigor during periods when individual corporations and their
management have been under attack.32 Previous proposals dealing with this
subject matter have not been implemented, but the recent number and scale
of corporate scandals and widespread public distrust of corporate boards
have encouraged shareholders to be vocal in their criticisms of board
mismanagement and the election processes.33 While selling stock had
27. THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET, SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE BALLOT (May 21, 2003),
http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/Audio/05_21_03_transcript.htm (Webcast Program); Garris et
al., supra note 24, at 25.
28. Bebchuk, supra note 8, at 43; see also infra Part VII. For example, some opponents claim
that the SEC has no legal authority to promulgate rules governing shareholder access to an issuer's
proxy materials, since such access relates to corporate governance, a topic that is traditionally left to
the states. Deborah Solomon & Michael Schroeder, Back Offt Businesses Go Toe to Toe With
SEC-Lawyers and Lobbyists Criticize Agency Proposals About Options, Proxies, Hedge and
Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2004, at Cl; Telephone Interview with James J. Moloney,
Partner, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, in Malibu, Cal. (Nov. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Interview].
Other opponents contend that investors are not well suited to nominate candidates as their strengths
lie in financial analysis, while those that traditionally nominate candidates are trained in business
operation. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 77.
29. Solomon, supra note 12.
30. Id.
31. SEC, Div. OF CORP. FIN., STAFF REPORT: REVIEW OF THE PROXY PROCESS REGARDING THE
NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF DIRECTORS, (July 15, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyrpt.htm [hereinafter STAFF REPORT].
32. Andrew R. Brownstein & Igor Kirman, Shareholder Access Proposals Conflict with Federal
Proxy Rules and State Law, 6 M&A LAW. 1, 1-3 (2003).
33. OLSON & MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.13. As a result of the corporate scandals, the stock
market plunged, resulting in great loss to institutional investors. Interview, supra note 28.
Institutional investors did not want to sell their stock while share price was low, since such an action
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formerly been a means of showing dissatisfaction with a company,34 it may
be inferred through the recent corporate crises that this method does not
effectively monitor nor improve corporate governance.35
This comment will argue for the passage of the proposed rule, which
will provide investors with a means of confronting the inefficient proxy
solicitation system currently in place. It will first discuss corporate
governance in the current environment of publicly held companies and why
it is important.36 Three groups of people are involved in corporate
governance, and their interaction is a concern that the proposed rule
addresses. 37  The SEC and other institutions have recently passed several
laws that attempt to solve flaws in the corporate governance process.35 Next,
would disadvantage portfolio return. Id. Institutional investors chose to become more vocal instead
of selling. Id.
34. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
35. In order to illustrate displeasure with a company's management, shareholders can sell the
company's stock and force share prices down. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, DETAILED COMMENTS OF
BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE "PROPOSED ELECTION CONTEST RULES" OF THE U.S. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 25 n. 127 (Dec. 22, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s7l903/brtl22203.pdf (citing as support Rachel Weber, Why
Local Economic Development Incentives Don't Create Jobs: The Role of Corporate Governance, 32
URB. LAW. 97, 113 (Winter 2000) (stating that "[i]n addition to exercising 'voice' to influence
management, shareholders have another powerful and more commonly used control tool at their
disposal: exit. If shareholders are not pleased with management's performance, they will 'vote with
their feet,' sell their stock, and force share values down.")) [hereinafter DETAILED COMMENTS OF
BRT]. The corporate governance crises of recent years occurred despite this shareholder weapon.
See CONGRESS WATCH, supra note 1, at 3 (citing William H. Donaldson, Corporate Governance:
What Has Happened and Where We Need to Go, BUS. ECON., July 1, 2003).
36. See infra Part II.
37. Shareholders, management, and the board of directors participate in maintaining corporate
governance at a corporation. Stewart M. Landefeld & Danielle Benderly, New SEC Rules Require
Expanded Nominating Committee Disclosure, INSIGHTS: THE CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR, Jan. 2004,
at 2, 4. Shareholders own an interest in a corporation through their purchase of its stock. John F.
Olson & Michael T. Adams, Composing a Balanced and Effective Board to Meet New Governance
Mandates, 59 BUS. LAW. 421, 424-25 (2004). A corporation's management is assigned with tasks
dealing with a company's operations. Id. at 425. The board supervises management's decisions and
ensures that management's actions are consistent with a company's corporate strategy. Id.; Burns,
supra note 6. The proposed rule addresses the interaction between shareholders and directors. With
the proposed rule, the SEC attempts to address shareholder complaints that corporations do not
respond to their concerns and requests. Solomon, supra note 12. Altering corporate elections would
tackle this problem by "improv[ing] the selection of directors and the incentives they face."
Bebchuk, supra note 8, at 44. Directors would consequently have incentives to be responsive to
shareholders if they wanted to remain in their position. See id.
38. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 with the intention of responding to the
corporate governance weaknesses that directly led to the crises of Enron and WorldCom. Thomas
G. Bost, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Summary, BRIEFLY... PERSP. ON LEGIS. REG. & LITIG.
4, Apr. 2003, at 1, 1, available at 2003 WL 1909734. The New York Stock Exchange and
NASDAQ adopted a series of rules promoting administration of management in the face of abuses
on the trading floor. Deborah Solomon, Moving the Market: SEC Will Make Stock Markets Fix How
They Run Themselves, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2004, at C3; INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES,
supra note 26, at 10. The SEC addressed shareholders' wishes for an effective means of
communication with boards of directors by issuing Release No. 33-8340, which requires companies
944
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the current proxy solicitation process will be presented, detailing the
methods in which shareholders can nominate candidates and the
disadvantages of each method.39
This comment will further describe the path to reform that led to the
proposal of the rule.40 While this is not the first time the SEC has proposed
a rule whose objective it is to increase shareholder participation in the
director nomination process, 4' several company and investor initiatives
indicate that this proposal has extensive support and that the public views its
passage as inevitable.42 Next, the proposed rule will be detailed.43 The SEC
has listed specific objectives it hopes the proposed rule will address relating
to corporate governance and objections to the current director nomination
to include significant information in their proxy materials about nomination committees and
nomination procedures. Catherine Meeker et al., SEC Proposes New Rules Relating to Director
Nomination Process and Shareholder Communications with Directors, M&A LAW., July-Aug. 2003,
at 11, 13. See Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications
Between Security Holders and Boards of Directors; Republication, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-
8340, 34-48825, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,262, 68 Fed. Reg. 69,204 (Dec. 11, 2003)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R pts. 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, 274).
39. See infra Part III. Shareholders may nominate directors by proposing candidates to a
corporation's nominating committee, by nominating a candidate at an annual shareholders' meeting,
or by soliciting proxies for candidates to be distributed to voting shareholders. Lipton &
Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 69; BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 14. These options leave shareholders
frustrated, because such actions are often costly and futile. BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 14;
Interview, supra note 28.
40. See infra Part IV.
41. The SEC addressed whether to allow shareholders' nominees for directors on the corporate
ballot in 1942, 1977, 1980, and 1992. STAFF REPORT, supra note 31. The SEC's focus often is a
result of a time period during which the corporation and management have been heavily criticized,
such as the corporate scandals of the 1970s and the takeover battles of the 1980s. Brownstein &
Kirman, supra note 32, at 1-3. The corporate scandals of 2001 brought the SEC's attention to
corporate governance reform once again. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 68.
42. Organizations, corporations, and shareholders support the proposed rule. Organizations such
as the pension plan AFSCME and the AFL-CIO have expressed their endorsement: AFSCME
submitted a similar proposal to six S&P 500 companies in the spring of 2002, while the AFL-CIO
submitted a rule-making petition in May 2003 seeking a rule to allow shareholder-nominated
candidates for director on a corporate ballot. OLSON & MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.13; Silvers &
Garland, supra note 15 (manuscript at 5). Two companies, Apria Healthcare Group, Inc. and
Ashland Inc., have voluntarily adopted shareholder director nomination plans. See Solomon &
Lublin, supra note 5; Phyllis Plitch, Ashland Joins Short List Seeking Shareholder Board Picks,
MORNINGSTAR.COM, Jan. 27, 2005,
http://news.momingstar.com/news/DJ/M01/D27/200501271858DOWJONESDJONLINE
001415.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). Individual investors support the proposed rule, stating that
the current director nomination process does not provide shareholders with the rights to which they
are entitled as owners of the corporation. STAFF REPORT, supra note 31.
43. See infra Part V.
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process.4 Under the proposed rule, a company's proxy statement will now
list a shareholder's nominees for director.45  To prevent abuse, however,
several safeguards have been implemented in order to ensure that the
proposed rule will be used for its stated objective and not for purposes that
could be detrimental to the affected companies. 46  The SEC finds its
authority to execute the proposed rule in federal law, but specifically states
that the proposed rule is not meant to conflict with state law, and state law
will govern if such an incompatibility occurs.47 A few states, however, have
introduced bills similar to the proposed rule.48
This comment will next describe the proxy environment in the post-
proposal era.49  The proposed rule is retroactive to the past proxy two
seasons.5° If any of the triggering events occurred in 2004 and the proposed
rule is passed in the near future, eligible shareholders may place qualified
directors on the company's proxy for the next annual shareholders'
meeting. 5' This comment will further discuss the specific arguments in
favor of and against the passage of the proposed rule.52 Proponents and
opponents have battled over how the proposed rule will affect corporate
44. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,626, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,784 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274).
45. Id. at 60,786.
46. These safeguards were added by the SEC to prevent shareholders from abusing the rule for
reasons unrelated to the well-being of the corporation. Garris et al., supra note 24, at 25.
Shareholders could only nominate a specific number of directors that could sit on the board at any
one time-a number determined by the size of the board. Id. The company would only be subject to
the proposed rule if one of the two triggering events-withhold votes or a proposal submitted
pursuant to Rule 14a-8-occurred. Id. Shareholders could only nominate candidates that are
"independent" from the board and the nominating shareholder. Id. Only shareholders who have no
intention of controlling the company could nominate a candidate for director. Id.
47. Id. at 60,784 (noting that "[t]he proposed rules would not provide security holders with the
right to nominate directors where it is prohibited by state law").
48. See Assemb. B. 2752, 2004 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004); H.B. 716, 68th Gen.
Assemb., Biennial Sess. (Vt. 2005). California introduced a bill that would require any companies
doing business in the state to permit nominations by investors, who have held at least two percent of
the company's outstanding stock for two years, to appear on the corporate proxy ballot. Assem. B.
2752. This bill was vetoed by the Governor on September 22, 2004. Official California Legislative
Information, AB 2752 Assembly Bill-History, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-
04/bill/asm/ab_2751-2800/ab_2752_bill_20040922_history.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
Vermont introduced a bill allowing a voting shareholder to have its director nominees placed on the
corporate proxy statement as long as the shareholder provides appropriate notice to the corporation,
if the corporation so requires. H.B. 716.
49. See infra Part VI.
50. The triggering events could be activated during shareholder meetings held after January 1,
2004, even though the rule had not been adopted by that date. Security Holder Director
Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,789.
51. Id.
52. See infra Part VII.
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governance, and whether or not the SEC may legally implement the rule.,3
This comment will argue that the opponents' arguments are self-serving. 4 It
is impossible to foresee the consequences of the proposed rule's passage, as
it is unprecedented. 5 Allowing director nomination processes to exist as
they are, however, would be more disadvantageous to shareholders and
corporate governance than any unintended drawbacks of the proposed rule. 6
This comment will subsequently explain why the proposed rule has not
yet been passed. 7  Strong lobbying efforts on behalf of high-ranking
government officials, as well as governmental bodies, have prevented its
acceptance by the SEC.58 In addition, several SEC commissioners object to
the rule in its current form, arguing that its safeguards are either too
53. Proponents of the proposed rule, who argue that shareholder participation in the current
director nomination process is too costly to be used as a valuable tool for ensuring proper corporate
governance, state that the proposed rule would be useful in ensuring that directors will be held
accountable for their actions. STAFF REPORT, supra note 31. Opponents of the proposed rule, on the
other hand, contend that "[g]iving some shareholders access to company proxies would be costly and
disruptive and would weaken the functioning of strong independent boards to the detriment of all
shareholders, by breeding misdirection and dissension." U.S. Chamber Urges SEC to Drop
Proposed Shareholder Access Rule, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1029, 1029 (June 7, 2004)
(according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a vocal critic of the proposed rule). Further,
opponents assert that the SEC does not have the authority to control a corporate proxy ballot. Id.
54. The great majority of opponents of the proposed rule included corporations, corporate
executives, and corporate directors. SEC, SUMMARY OF COMMENTS: IN RESPONSE TO THE
COMMISSION'S PROPOSED RULES RELATING TO SECURITY HOLDER DIRECTOR NOMINATIONS (Mar.
5, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/extra/s7l903summary.htm [hereinafter SUMMARY OF
COMMENTS]. These groups would naturally oppose the proposed rule because the passage of the
rule would give shareholders more power by allowing them to nominate directors-a privilege
which had previously been given only to existing directors and nominating committees-in certain
circumstances. See Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,789. Additionally, it
would be expected for corporate directors to prevent shareholders from exercising the proposed rule
by withholding votes from the director and the director's colleagues. See id.
55. The proposed rule is the first of its type to be implemented. Joseph A. Grundfest, Advice and
Consent: An Alternative Mechanism for Shareholder Participation in the Nomination and Election
of Corporate Directors, in SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE CORPORATE BALLOT (Lucian Bebchuk
ed., forthcoming June 2006) (manuscript at 6, available at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/faculty/grundfest/advice.pdf).
56. Former SEC Chairman William Donaldson believes the proposed rule is a "clever way" to
address corporate governance troubles. Judith Bums, Holder Groups Worry SEC Loses Steam on
Proxies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2004, at B2H. If directors refuse to address shareholders' concerns,
then shareholders "ought to at least have an opportunity to have a voice on the board." Id. If the
proposed rule would be used for dubious purposes by investors, the SEC will be quick to amend it.
Interview, supra note 28.
57. See infra Part VIII.
58. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Treasury Secretary John Snow have been vocal critics
of the proposed rule. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Feels Pressure to Weaken Some Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
May 10, 2004, at C5; U.S. Chamber Urges SEC to Drop Proposed Shareholder Access Rule, supra
note 53, at 1029.
947
restrictive 59 or not restrictive enough. 6°  In the face of these objections,
former SEC Chairman William Donaldson, in office at the time of the rule's
proposal, considered altering the proposed rule, while present SEC
Chairman Christopher Cox favors increasing shareholder participation in the
director nomination process through the modem medium of the Internet.61
Finally, the conclusion will discuss the short-term and long-term effects of
the rule, should it be passed.62 The comment also suggests that the proposal
should be passed because of the current corporate governance environment,
the strength of support proponents have shown, and the positive effects that
the proposed rule's adoption will have on shareholders, directors, and
publicly held corporations.6 3
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Corporate governance refers to supervision of a company's
management. 64  Typically, such administration includes ensuring the
directors properly run management and the shareholders are treated
59. Republican commissioners Cynthia Glassman and Paul Atkins oppose even alternate, more
lenient versions of the proposed rule. See Deborah Solomon, SEC May Dilute Plan to Increase
Holders' Power-Under Pressure From Businesses and Resistance From Democrats, Donaldson
Considers Alternative, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2004, at Cl. Commissioner Atkins believes that only
companies with proven troubles should be subject to the proposed rule. Solomon & Lublin, supra
note 5.
60. Democratic commissioners Roel Campos and Harvey Goldschmid favor the proposed rule in
its original form, or a tougher version. Solomon, supra note 59.
61, Chairman Donaldson considered a number of proposals in order to appease both opponents
to the rule and the Republican commissioners. Id. One such alternative called for nomination
committees to replace a director whom shareholders have targeted for removal. Deborah Solomon,
SEC Nears Compromise on Shareholder Plan, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2004, at Cl [hereinafter
Solomon, Compromise]. Another alternative would have prevented companies from having to put a
shareholder-nominated director candidate on the corporate ballot if directors and shareholders agreed
upon a director to place in an available space on the board. Id. The SEC staff is also considering
adjusting the triggering events. Deborah Solomon, Moving the Market: SEC May Temper Plan To
Boost Shareholders' Powers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2004, at C3. While not expressly commenting
on the proposed rule, Chairman Cox believes that the Internet may be used by shareholders as an
effective means to wage proxy fights because it provides widespread communication of information
at an "insignifican[t]" cost. SEC's New Leader Shares His Views On Range of Issues, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 19, 2005, at A13.
62. See infra Part IX.
63. The latest corporate governance crises of Enron and WorldCom emphasized the
consequences that result in the face of bad board performance and poor corporate governance
practices. See Bebchuk, supra note 8, at 44. Proponents for change, such as pension plans, are
taking affirmative action to allow shareholder nominations on the corporate ballot. See OLSON &
MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.13. Corporations have adopted shareholder director nomination plans
as well. See, e.g., Solomon & Lublin, supra note 5; Plitch, supra note 42. Reforming corporate
elections would improve the selection of directors, prevent such scandals from occurring in the
future, and enhance shareholders' confidence in the corporations in which they invest. See OLSON &
MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.13.
64. Bums, supra note 6.
[Vol. 33: 937, 2006] We Talk, You Listen.
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
equitably. 65 Companies who practice good corporate governance have such
qualities as formal evaluation of directors and responsiveness to shareholder
requests for information.66 Boards of directors of companies with good
corporate governance are primarily paid in company stock or a similar type
of compensation. 6 ' These boards are also comprised of a majority of
directors who are "independent of the company and its managers," and own
a substantial amount of the company's stock.68
A. Why Corporate Governance Matters
Patrick McGurn of the proxy-advisory firm Institutional Shareholder
Services stated that "poor governance is a substantial risk factor" for
investors. 69 Good corporate governance, including formal evaluation of the
board of directors, assures shareholders that directors are held accountable
for the implementation of strategies which result from the corporate
objective, and that the company conforms to federal and state law as well as
the company's own bylaws. 0 Good corporate governance is of great
concern to shareholders even though it does not guarantee superior profits on
investments.7 Despite this return uncertainty, studies show that institutional
investors often pay an average premium of fourteen percent for shares of a
company that is managed according to high corporate governance
standards.
7 2
B. Reforms Related to Corporate Governance
The reforms described below are depicted as "the most far-reaching set
of new corporate regulation since the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934." 73 These developments, aimed at
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing the opinion of consultants McKinsey & Co.).
68. Id. (citing the opinion of consultants McKinsey & Co.).
69. Id.
70. International ' Chamber of Commerce, Why Corporate Governance Matters,
http://www.iccwbo.org/CorpGov/whycorpgov.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
71. Bums, supra note 6.
72. Id. Institutional investors are found to pay as much as a thirty percent premium for shares in
well-governed companies in emerging markets. International Chamber of Commerce, supra note
70.
73. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 68. The Securities Act of 1933, often referred to as
the "truth in securities" regulation, was passed by Congress in light of two objectives: (1) "require
that investors receive financial and other significant information concerning securities being offered
949
improving corporate governance practices, lead to greater responsiveness on
the part of corporations addressing issues of director responsibility and
oversight.74  Companies are currently working to comply with their
requirements.75
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was passed in response to the Enron,
WorldCom, and other corporate crises and accounting scandals.
7 6
Congress's stated objective in passing this act was to "protect investors by
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made
pursuant to the securities laws."77  By regulating certain activities and
implementing regulatory bodies, 78 Congress intended to strengthen both
corporate governance and investor confidence by "improving the quality of
corporate disclosure and financial reporting, strengthen[ing] the
independence of accounting firms, and increas[ing] the role and
responsibility of corporate officers and directors in financial statements and
corporate disclosures.
'
"
79
for public sale;" and (2) "prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of
securities." SEC, How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last modified Feb. 11, 2005). These objectives are achieved
by requiring the registration of securities, which provides for disclosure of essential financial
information. Id. Congress created the SEC with the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Id. With this Act, Congress provided the SEC with power over the entire securities industry,
as well as the ability to discipline both persons and entities that commit prohibited conduct in the
market. Id.
74. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 69. These reforms include strengthening the
standards of independence for directors, requiring the audit, nominating, and compensation
committees to be composed of all independent directors, and imposing stricter standards for
members of the audit committee. Id. at 88.
75. Id. at 68.
76. Bost, supra note 38, at 4; see also OLSON & MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.1. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 ordered the execution of several reforms aimed at "enhanc[ing] corporate
responsibility, enhanc[ing] financial disclosures and combat[ing] corporate and accounting fraud."
SEC, supra note 73.
77. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
78. Examples of such measures include forbidding a corporation's audit firm from providing
consulting services to its client; creating the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to
oversee the activities of the auditor; requiring corporate counsel to report a "'material violation' of
securities law, a breach of fiduciary duty, or similar violation;" forbidding personal loans to
executives; forbidding insiders from trading during pension fund blackouts; protecting corporate
whistle-blowers; and requiring CEOs and CFOs to certify a corporation's periodic reports filed
pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Bost, supra note 38, at 5-20.
79. Id. at 4.
950
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2. Stock Exchanges
An SEC examination of the operation and regulation of the New York
Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and three other exchanges in 2003 revealed
pervasive abuses on the trading floor, leading to investor deception.8 ° As a
result, the SEC pushed the exchanges to enhance their corporate governance
practices." The NYSE and NASDAQ soon adopted new rules promoting
administration of management.8 2  These rules operate to restrict the
definition of director independence 83 and strengthen board committee
structures.
84
3. SEC Release No. 33-8340
The SEC has become responsive to shareholders' wishes for an effective
means of communication with boards of directors. It believes that by
providing investors with greater knowledge about how to communicate with
directors, the "transparency of board operations" will be improved and
shareholders will have an enhanced understanding about the companies in
which they invest.86 To address these goals, the SEC issued a series of rules
in 2003 that require publicly held companies to include in their proxy
statements significant additional information about their nominating
committees and their processes for nominating directors.8 7 The enhanced
80. Solomon, supra note 38.
81. Bums, supra note 6.
82. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, supra note 26, at 10. These new regulations are
detailed in the NYSE Listed Company Manual Section 303A.04 and NASD Rule 43.50(c).
Landefeld & Benderly, supra note 37, at 2 & n.2.
83. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, supra note 26, at 10. With these improvements,
the "old ceiling became the new floor." Id. at 9.
84. Id. Audit, nominating, and compensation committees were affected by these rules. As a
result of these changes, the NYSE requires an independent audit committees and separate
nominating and compensation committees, also composed of solely independent directors. Id.
Under NASDAQ rules, at least a majority of the compensation and nominating committees must be
independent. Id. Both markets require that directors periodically hold meetings without
management present. Id.
85. Meeker et al., supra note 38, at 13.
86. Id.
87. See Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications Between
Security Holders and Boards of Directors; Republication, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8340, 34-
48,825, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,262, 68 Fed. Reg. 69,204 (Dec. 11, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 270, 274). The additional disclosures that now must be
included in the proxy statement are: (1) "'minimum qualification' of nominees;" (2) "[description
of] the material terms of the company's policy for accepting shareholder recommendations,
including a specific statement as to whether the nominating committee will consider shareholder
disclosure is anticipated to provide shareholders with detailed supplementary
information, which can be used to assess the boards and nominating
committees.88 The new rules also require the proxy statement to disclose
how the company's shareholders can communicate with directors. 89 These
rules improve corporate governance by encouraging director operations to be
more visible.90
C. Participants
Corporate governance in a particular corporation depends on three
groups: "shareholders, management, and the board of directors." 91
Shareholders provide capital to the corporation through their purchase of
the company's stock, retaining ownership interest. 92 Management handles
"decisions regarding corporate operations, including strategic planning, risk
management, and financial reporting." 93 The board of directors supervises
the management's performance on behalf of the shareholders.94 The board
also oversees corporate strategy and the production of the company's
financial reports, which are provided to shareholders by the corporation.
95
During the first half of the twentieth century, share ownership was
fragmented among small individual investors.96 The ownership of publicly
held companies in the U.S. has gradually become more condensed.97 This
development became more rapid in the late 1990s with the extraordinary
development of the mutual fund industry and indexed equity money
recommended candidates;" (3) "evaluation of candidates;" and (4) "source of nominees." Landefeld
& Benderly, supra note 37, at 4-5.
88. Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications Between
Security Holders and Boards of Directors; Republication, 68 Fed. Reg. at 69,205.
89. Landefeld & Benderly, supra note 37, at 2. Specifically, the proxy statement must now
include answers to several questions: (1) "Does the company have a process for shareholders to
communicate with the board of directors?"; (2) "If not, why does the board of directors think that it
is appropriate not to have a process?"; (3) "If so, how do shareholders send communications to the
board of directors and, if applicable, to specific individual directors?"; (4) "Does the company filter
shareholder communications intended for the board of directors, and, if so, what is the company's
process for determining which communications will be relayed to board members?"; (5) "Does the
company have a policy about directors attending the annual shareholder meeting? How many of the
company's directors attended the prior year's annual shareholder meeting?" Id. at 5.
90. Id. at 2.
91. Olson & Adams, supra note 37, at 424.
92. Id. at 424-25.
93. Id. at 425.
94. Id.
95. Bums, supra note 6. Publicly held companies in the United States normally have twelve
board members. Id.
96. Silvers & Garland, supra note 15 (manuscript at 1).
97. Id.
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management. 98 By the end of the twentieth century, mutual funds, pension
funds, and money managers working for pension funds owned a substantial
portion of publicly held companies. 99 The groups, often called institutional
investors,'t ° can be very effective at demanding corporate governance
changes because of the breadth of their holdings.'0 ' Due to the potential
strength of their influence, institutional investors believe they have a
responsibility to press companies for both better corporate governance and
strong stock performance. 02
One such institutional investor is the California Public Employees'
Retirement System ("CalPERS"). First operational in 1932, CalPERS today
manages funds for more than 1.4 million public employees, retirees, and
their families. 10 3 Investments and income from 2003 to 2004 totaled more
than $24 billion.itH A thirteen-member board of administration, including
elected, appointed, and statutory-designated officials, oversees the fund. 0 5
Before CalPERS reached a level of distinction among its peers in the 1980s,
institutional investors often "dumped their shares"'1 6 if discontented with a
company. 10 7  CalPERS, however, conducted itself in an entirely different
98. Id.
99. Id. In 1998, institutional investors held more than 60% of the voting shares of important
corporations. Roberta S. Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional
Shareholders?, 60 BUS. LAW. 1, 9-10 (2004). In 2002, institutional investors held 49.8% of U.S.
equities. Id. at 10. This decline may have been a consequence of the corporate governance scandals
of 2001. See id.
100. In addition to these groups, institutional investors also include labor unions, insurance
companies, and bank trust departments. Id. at 9.
101. Bums, supra note 6. It may be inferred that corporations succumb to the will of institutional
investors because of the fear that they will sell stock if unhappy, plunging share price. However,
James E. Heard, Vice Chairman of ISS, a proxy advisory service, stated that institutional investors
are "serious long-term investors." INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, supra note 26, at 7.
102. Burns, supra note 6 (citing TIAA-CREF).
103. CalPERS, About CalPERS, http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/home.xml (last
visited Dec. 1, 2004).
104. CaIPERS, Facts at a Glance, http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/facts/general.pdf (last
visited Dec. 1, 2004).
105. Id. at 2.
106. This practice is often called "voting with your feet." See DETAILED COMMENTS OF BRT,
supra note 35 (citing Rachel Weber, Why Local Economic Development Incentives Don 't Create
Jobs: The Role of Corporate Governance, 32 URB. LAW. 97, 113 (Winter 2000) (stating that "[i]n
addition to exercising 'voice' to influence management, shareholders have another powerful and
more commonly used control tool at their disposal: exit. If shareholders are not pleased with
management's performance, they will 'vote with their feet,' sell their stock, and force share values
down")).
107. Jonathan Weil & Joann S. Lublin, Gadfly Activism at Calpers Leads to Possible Ouster of
President, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2004, at Al.
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manner: "[i]f you don't govern the company well, it told corporate board
members, we'll publicize your shortcomings and, possibly, withhold votes
for your re-election."' 8 CalPERS is a proponent of the SEC proposed rule
and believes that shareholders should have effective access to the director
nomination process. 109
Another institutional investor is the Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association--College Retirement Equities Fund ("TIAA-CREF"). At
present, TIAA-CREF manages the assets of 3.2 million participants, and its
debt and equity investments totaled $36.5 billion in 2003. l l0 In its corporate
governance agenda, TIAA-CREF focuses on the quality of the board."' It
believes that shareholders should withhold votes from directors whose
actions indicate that their election to the board would be against
shareholders' best interests.' 12
D. Current Corporate Governance Issues
A frequent complaint regarding boards of directors is that they too
strictly control the director nomination processes." 3  Nominating
committees suggest candidates for inclusion on a company's proxy ballot.' '
The board takes the nominating committee's recommendations into
consideration and selects nominees.1"' Then, shareholders vote for
candidates."16 Some shareholders do not agree with this process: they would
like companies to disclose how they decide candidate qualifications and deal
with shareholder-nominated candidates.' 17 In addition, some shareholders
would like companies to disclose shareholder candidates in a company's
proxy materials." 8 Unresponsiveness to these requests has left shareholders
"properly infuriated" and has encouraged investors to play a more active role
108. Id. CalPERS responded recently to corporate governance-related controversies at several
large oil companies, pushing major oil companies to independently audit their energy-reserve
estimates, thereby coercing the oil industry to "improve the transparency of its reserves accounting."
Chip Cummins, Outside Auditing of Oil Reserves Pushed by Calpers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2004, at
A6.
109. CALPERS, U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES (Apr. 6, 2005), http://www.calpers-
govemance.org/principles/domestic/us/downloads/us-corpgov-principles.pdf.
110. TIAA-CREF, 2003 COMPANY HIGHLIGHTS (2003), http://www.tiaa-
cref.org/AnnualReport2003/htm/company-highlights.htm.
111. TIAA-CREF, Policy Statement on Corporate Governance, http://www.tiaa-
cref.org/pubs/html/governance-policy/index.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
112. Id.
113. Burns, supra note 6.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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in corporate governance." 9 As a result, boards of directors are focusing on
corporate governance reforms. 2 °
Another shareholders' corporate governance concern relates to their
power to replace directors. Replacement of directors is an important
safeguard in the "structure of ... corporate law."'121  Theoretically, if
directors do not act in shareholders' interests, or if they appear unqualified to
serve on the board, shareholders have the power to replace them.
22
However, shareholders' power to replace directors is "largely a myth."',
2 3
Even in corporations that continually under-perform, attempts to replace
directors are uncommon. 24  Company-nominated directors usually run
unopposed and their election is guaranteed, 25 whether or not their interests
are equal to shareholder's interests to maximize shareholder value. 1
26
III. PROXY SOLICITATION
A. What is a Proxy?
A proxy is a document in which a shareholder authorizes another person
to vote on the shareholders' behalf at a shareholders' meeting.1
2 7
119. Burns, supra note 6 (quoting Goldman, Sachs & Co. managing director Abby Joseph Cohen
at a corporate governance conference).
120. Id. (referring to the opinion of Goldman, Sachs & Co. managing director Abby Joseph Cohen
as stated at a corporate governance conference).
121. Bebchuk, supra note 8, at 44.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 45.
124. Id.
125. "The key for a director's re-election is remaining on the firm's slate." Id. Because of the
expenses and difficulties that accompany shareholders' efforts to nominate a director by launching a
proxy contest, it is rare when a candidate runs against another who was not nominated by the current
board or the nominating committee. See id. If the number of candidates equals the number of
available spaces on the board, then all of the candidates on the firm's slate will be elected. See id.
"[T]he formidable advantages that incumbents enjoy permit boards sympathetic to current
management to retain control almost without limit." John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson,
Corporate Law and the Longterm Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV.
1313, 1361 (1992) (citing George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the
Public Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 881, 903-05 (1989)).
126. Bebchuk, supra note 8, at 45.
127. Carell & Hanks, supra note 7, at 24.
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B. Rules Relating to Proxy Solicitation
The SEC obtained extensive control over proxy solicitation of publicly
held companies with Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Section 14"), which makes it unlawful for such a corporation to solicit
proxy votes in contravention of SEC rules and regulations.'2 8 Congress
created this Section with the intention of addressing the problem of a board
of directors' ability to control the proxy process.
129
Rule 14a-8, which implements Section 14, was designed to give small
individual investors an opportunity to have their voice heard on certain
governance issues through shareholder proposals included on a company's
proxy ballot. 130  Rule 14a-8(i)(8), however, permits the corporation to omit
shareholder proposals that relate to election of directors.1
3
'
C. Current Nomination Procedure
Under existing SEC rules, shareholders are given an opportunity to vote
only on those candidates nominated by the company. 3 2  In voting on the
director slate, the shareholder may choose to approve all directors, withhold
their vote from all directors, or approve all directors except specific directors
chosen by the shareholder. 3 3  Shareholders can nominate candidates to
replace incumbent directors, but they cannot include their nominee's name
on the company's official proxy, which lists only the company's
candidates. '3
128. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2000). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Section 14 in particular,
regulates the disclosure a corporation makes in materials sent out to investors for the purpose of
requesting support in annual shareholders' meetings. SEC, supra note 73.
129. Silvers & Garland, supra note 15 (manuscript at 1-2). In 1934, the Committee on Banking
and Currency recommended that the SEC govern proxy solicitation and issuance in order to prevent
a corporation from abusing the proxy process by misstating or omitting important information from
proxy materials. S. REP. No. 73-792, at 12 (1934) (reporting the comments of Mr. Fletcher on behalf
of the Committee on Banking and Currency). Prior to this rule's passage, corporations often would
not disclose to shareholders the real reasons why the shareholders' vote was wanted. Id. In one
instance, the president of a company sent proxy materials to shareholders, which sought their
approval of a number of corporate transactions. Id. The corporation, however, did not reveal in its
materials a number of factors which could influence the voters' decision, such as the president's
personal interest in the proposed transactions and undisclosed company stock options. Id. Congress
created Section 14 so that a stockholder will have sufficient knowledge of a corporation's financial
condition and policies in order to make an informed vote. Id.
130. Silvers & Garland, supra note 15 (manuscript at 1).
131. Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 32, at 3-4.
132. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,626, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,786 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274).
133. RIcHARD J. DALY, STATEMENT FOR ROUNDTABLE (2004), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dir-
nominations/adp022704.pdf.
134. Solomon, supra note 12.
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D. How a Shareholder can Participate in the Current Nomination
Procedure
Under the existing corporate governance system, shareholders can
nominate directors through a number of alternative methods. Shareholders
may propose potential director candidates to a company's nominating
committee.135 A nominating committee has a duty to consider qualified
candidates and to select nominees that it believes will best serve the interests
of the company and its investors. 13 6 A shareholder may nominate a director
at the annual shareholders' meeting, as long as the nomination complies with
state law and company bylaw requirements. 137 Shareholders may attempt to
prevent the nomination of a director by withholding authority from specific
candidates. 138  In order to replace one or more incumbent directors,
shareholders have the right to nominate their own director candidates by
soliciting proxies for them (also called a "proxy fight" or "election
contest"). 139
Despite these options, shareholders are increasingly frustrated.
140
Investors view these means of participation as "toothless" and insufficient,
especially if they wish to use these tools in order to strike out and hold
unproductive directors accountable for their actions.
141
Security holders have indicated that recommending candidates to a
company's nominating committee, although possible, generally is futile.'
42
135. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 69.
136. Id.
137. BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 14.
138. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 69.
139. See id. This typically occurs if the company and its incumbent directors are performing
poorly. Interview, supra note 28.
140. Silvers & Garland, supra note 15 (manuscript at 3).
141. Id. Shareholder participation in the director nomination process may be viewed as
"toothless" because often these efforts are very costly or futile. Printing and mailing proxy
statements to run an election contest may result in expenditures of more than one million dollars.
Interview, supra note 28. The majority of shareholders do not have the funds to conduct a proxy
contest. See Bebchuk, supra note 8, at 45. Shareholders have the ability to participate in the
nomination process without spending money by recommending candidates to a corporation's
nominating committee or by nominating directors at the shareholders' annual meeting. BRIEFING
PAPER, supra note 14. Such actions are ineffectual, however, because obtaining access to a
nominating committee is difficult, and a candidate presented at an annual meeting is unlikely to
receive sufficient support for nomination. Id.; Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-48,626, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,786
(proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274). Shareholders have no
effective means of nominating a candidate for the board of directors. Silvers & Garland, supra note
15 (manuscript at 3).
142. BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 14.
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Shareholders have a difficult time gaining access to board members and
nominating committees. 43  Even if access is granted, nomination
committees seldom nominate candidates recommended by investors. 144
Although shareholders may nominate directors at the shareholders'
annual meeting, this action is largely ineffective. Most shareholders vote
through a mailed proxy ballot instead of voting in person at the actual
meeting. 145  A candidate presented at an annual meeting is unlikely to
receive sufficient support for nomination. 1
46
While withholding votes from director candidates has become a more
common practice, it has no effect in states such as Delaware, which use
plurality rather than majority voting for board elections.' 47 Plurality voting
is a process in which the nominee winning the greatest number of votes is
elected. 48 If the number of nominees equals the number of available board
positions, each nominee will be elected, regardless of whether they received
only a single vote or whether votes were withheld from that nominee.
49
Most often, an election contest by means of a proxy fight is a "last
resort" for investors. 150 Not only is an election contest extremely disruptive
to the entire company, 5 ' but the expenses and difficulties of running an
election contest make them uncommon.'52 This process involves printing
143. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,786. Shareholders cannot access a
nominating committee's discussions. Michael E. Murphy, Dispelling Tina 's Ghost From The Post-
Enron Corporate Governance Debate, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 63, 95 (2002).
144. BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 14. According to corporate insiders, nomination committees are
not the independent and objective bodies they were intended to be. Jayne W. Barnard, Shareholder
Access to the Proxy Revisited, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 37, 49 (1990). In a majority of companies, a
nominating committee is under the control of the CEO and complies with the CEO's demands. Id.
A nominating committee is unlikely to solicit shareholders' recommendations for director
candidates. Id. at 49-50. However, if a shareholder recommends a potential candidate to the
nominating committee, a nominating committee rarely nominates these candidates officially. Id. at
49-51. Shareholders further disapprove of nominating committees because corporations are not
obligated to disclose why a shareholder-nominated candidate was not listed on a corporate proxy
ballot. Lewis J. Sundquist III, Comment, Proposal to Allow Shareholder Nomination of Corporate
Directors: Overreaction in Times of Corporate Scandal, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1471, 1477
(2004).
145. BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 14; see also Sundquist, supra note 144, at 1476-77. Since most
shareholders do not vote at the actual annual meeting, a candidate presented at the meeting is not
likely to obtain the number of votes necessary for a seat on the board. Sundquist, supra.
146. BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 14.
147. Silvers & Garland, supra note 15 (manuscript at 3).
148. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,786 n.52.
149. Id.
150. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 69.
151. Id.
152. Bebchuk, supra note 8, at 45. The costs of waging a proxy contest would be significantly
decreased if proxy materials were permitted to be delivered to shareholders through the Internet.
Phyllis Plitch, SEC's Online Plan to Cut Costs May Rally Dissident Investors, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27,
2005, at C3. The SEC recently proposed a rule which would amend the proxy rules in such a way as
to allow Internet delivery. Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
958
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and mailing proxy statements to all record holders of stock, which requires
substantial expenditures that run in the millions of dollars. 15 3 Furthermore,
the shareholders' proxy materials must comply with the SEC's proxy
rules. 54 The company's lawyers regularly attack such proxy materials as
deficient. '5 5
Shareholders' means of nominating candidates are limited and often
fruitless. Several large institutional investors have communicated that the
director nomination process is fundamentally a "rubber stamp" for the
board-elected nominees. 
15 6
IV. PATH TO REFORM
A. Prior SEC Attempts To Involve Shareholders in the Nomination Process
This proposed rule is not the first that the SEC has made in an attempt to
place shareholder-nominated board candidates on the corporate proxy ballot.
Such proposals are often introduced after periods during which the
corporation and management have been heavily criticized, such as
subsequent to the corporate scandals of the 1970s and the "hostile takeover
battles" of the 1980s.157  Therefore, the proposed rule was a natural
consequence of the publicity of the "unprecedented" corporate scandals of
2001, which caused widespread mistrust of boards and management among
the public.1
58
1. 1942
The SEC first addressed the issue of allowing shareholders' nominees
for director on a company's proxy ballot in 1942.15' At that time, the SEC
52,926, Investment Company Act Release No. 27, 182, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,598 (proposed Dec. 15,
2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274).
153. Interview, supra note 28.
154. BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 14.
155. Interview, supra note 28.
156. OLSON & MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.13.
157. Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 32, at 1, 3.
158. Id.
159. See Security and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules: Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821,
and H.R. 2019 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong. 17-19 (1943)
(testimony of Chairman Ganson Purcell).
959
requested that its staff review the proxy rules and recommend changes.' 60
The staff proposed that "stockholders be permitted to use the management's
proxy statement to canvass [sic] stockholders generally for the election of
their own nominees for directorships, as well as for the nominees of the
management."' 16' Corporations countered that shareholders would make
unwise decisions by nominating and electing careless directors.
162
Consequently, the staff proposal was not adopted. 1
63
2. 1977
In the 1970s, hundreds of U.S. companies were accused of unlawful
payments to international politicians and corporations.' 64 In response, the
SEC conducted a broad review of corporate governance, including an
appraisal of shareholder communications and shareholder participation in
the director election process. The SEC called for public comment in
addressing whether "shareholders [should] have access to management's
proxy soliciting materials for the purpose of nominating persons of their
choice to serve on the board of directors."'' 66 Unexpectedly, the proposal
gained support from the Business Roundtable, a group of CEOs that is a
vocal opponent of the SEC's latest proposal. 67 In a 1977 statement, the
Business Roundtable stated that "shareholders 'are the proper persons to
resolve the question' of how directors should be nominated.' ' 168 But the SEC
160. Id. (testimony of Chairman Ganson Purcell).
161. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,626, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,786 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274) (citing the testimony of Chairman Ganson Purcell before
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, in SEC Release No. 34-3337 (Dec. 18,
1942)).
162. Solomon & Lublin, supra note 5.
163. Id. The rejection of the proposed rule serves as an example of how SEC decisions may be
motivated more by political concerns than concerns for shareholders' well-being. Milton V.
Freeman was the SEC attorney who wrote the plan. Id. Some members of Congress labeled him a
communist, and the SEC did not adopt the proposal. Id. This political motivation is indicative of
the present time. Passage of the current proposed rule has been substantially delayed by opposition
from the two Republican commissioners, while the two Democratic commissioners support it.
Solomon, supra note 59.
164. Solomon & Lublin, supra note 5.
165. STAFF REPORT, supra note 31.
166. Re-examination of Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder
Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Securities Act
Release No. 34-13,482, Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 35-20,008, Investment
Company Act Release No. 9740, 12 S.E.C. Docket 267 (Apr. 28, 1977).
167. Solomon & Lublin, supra note 5.
168. Id. Nominating committees serve to propose candidates for director elections. Sundquist,
supra note 144, at 1477. Because nominating committees are ideally composed of independent
directors, they objectively recommend candidates based on the candidate's qualifications and the
needs of the shareholders and corporation. Bernard Black et al., Corporate Governance in Korea at
960
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did not adopt the proposal, claiming it would be of no use since companies
were voluntarily creating nominating committees.
69
3. 1980
The SEC yet again considered adopting a shareholder director
nomination rule in 1980, and instructed its staff to make a recommendation.
Because of the rising popularity of nominating committees, the staff advised
the Senate that the SEC should not propose a proxy access rule at the time,
170
but rather supervise the development of nominating committees.' 7' If many
companies did not adopt nominating committees, or if nominating
committees did not improve shareholders' participation in the election
processes, then an SEC rule might be required.'
4. 1992
The SEC considered proposing a shareholder director nomination rule in
1992, but was hesitant because of the issue's potentially disruptive effect.'73
The idea was forcefully condemned: "[p]roposals to require the company to
include shareholder nominees in the company's proxy statement would
represent a substantial change in the Commission's proxy rules."'' 74 Rather
than a shareholder access rule, the SEC adopted broad proxy revisions that
would make it easier for shareholders to conduct proxy fights.1
75
the Millennium: Enhancing International Competitiveness, 26 J. CORP. L. 546, 588 (2001). This
provides much-needed accountability to the nomination process. Id. However, nominating
committees may not be as independent as they are intended to be; there is evidence that they are
controlled by CEOs in a majority of corporations. Barnard, supra note 144, at 49.
169. Solomon & Lublin, supra note 5.
170. STAFF REPORT, supra note 31.
171. Id.
172. SEC, Div. OF CORP. FIN., STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY A60-65, A69
(Sept. 4, 1980).
173. Solomon & Lublin, supra note 5.
174. Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31326,
57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (Oct. 22, 1992).
175. Solomon & Lublin, supra note 5.
B. Catalysts for the Proposed Rule
1. Corporate Crises
As noted in Part I, the string of scandals in 2001 involving corporate
governance failures encouraged a new focus on reform. 7 6  The SEC's
interest in the shareholder nomination process reawakened. 1
77
2. Affirmative Institutional Investor and Corporate Action
a. AFSCME
Labor-affiliated institutional investors became more vocal about
promoting the adoption of a shareholder access rule in the spring of 2002.178
The pension plan for the American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees ("AFSCME") devised a proposal in December 2002
that would give shareholders greater access to corporate proxies.179 This
proposal, submitted to six S&P 500 corporations, would have required these
"companies to include on their proxy ballot the name of a board candidate
who was nominated by shareholders holding at least [three] percent of a
company's stock."' 80  While the SEC issued these companies no-action
letters that allowed the companies to keep the AFSCME proposal off their
proxy materials,' 8 ' the incident caused such concern among agency officials
that the SEC instructed the Division to provide a staff report on the state of
shareholder access,182 with an "eye toward possible reforms."'
183
176. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 68.
177. Landefeld & Benderly, supra note 37, at 2.
178. Silvers & Garland, supra note 15 (manuscript at 5). As a result of the corporate scandals of
2001, the stock market plunged, resulting in great loss to institutional investors. Interview, supra
note 28. Institutional investors did not want to sell their stock while share price was low, since such
an action would disadvantage portfolio return. Id. Institutional investors became more vocal
immediately after these crises, instead of selling. Id.
179. OLSON & MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.13.
180. Id. The S&P corporations targeted include Citigroup, Sears Roebuck & Co., Exxon Mobil
Corp., AOL Time-Warner, Eastman Kodak Co., and the Bank of New York, Id. AFSCME also
lobbied 150 public employee pension funds to adopt voting policies in favor of such "shareholder
access" initiatives. Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 32, at 1.
181. The Division allowed these companies to keep the shareholder proposals off of their proxy
materials because the proposals "relate[d] to an election for membership on the company's board of
directors" in violation of Rule 14a-8(i)(8) STAFF REPORT, supra note 31.
182. OLSON & MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.13.
183. Silvers & Garland, supra note 15 (manuscript at 5).
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b. Apria Healthcare, Inc.
Despite the apparent inactivity by the SEC, one company decided to act
on its own by voluntarily adopting a shareholder director nomination plan.'
8 4
In 2003, board chairman Ralph Whitworth convinced the split board'85 of
Apria Healthcare Group, Inc. ("Apria"), a company that provides home
healthcare products and services, 186 to let shareholders nominate
candidates. 187 Under this new plan, stockholders owning at least five percent
of Apria stock continuously for two years can nominate two new directors
every year for placement on the company's official proxy ballot. 8 8 This
move marked the first time that a publicly-held U.S. company has acted to
develop shareholders' participation in the board selection process.'89 The
corporate world saw Apria as a leader in good corporate governance. Its
achievement "is the wave of the future," said Richard Ferlauto, AFSCME's
director of pension investment policy, who further expressed that "[t]he
fundamental problem in corporate governance today is that shareholders
don't have real power to elect the board of directors."' 90
The Apria move intensified the SEC's attention on the issue of
shareholder director nominations. A shareholder's appeal to overturn recent
no-action letters' 9' prompted the SEC to ask the Division in April 2003 to
devise possible modifications to the proxy rules regarding the shareholders'
participation in the election of directors. 9 2
184. Interview, supra note 28.
185. Id. Mr. Whitworth won support from his fellow board members by pointing out that a "more
open election process" would strengthen the board's independence and improve effectiveness.
Joann S. Lublin, Apria Will Let Holders Nominate Board Candidates, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2003, at
B2.
186. Apria Healthcare, Inc., About Apria, http://www.apria.com/aboutapria/0,2746,68,00.html
(last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
187. Solomon & Lublin, supra note 5.
188. Id. The plan was made effective in 2004, but no shareholders came forward with their
nominees in time for the 2004 annual shareholders' meeting. Id.
189. Lublin, supra note 185.
190. Id.
191. Landefeld & Benderly, supra note 37, at 2 (citing E-mail from James McRitchie, Editor,
CorpGov.Net, to William Donaldson, Chairman, United States Securities and Exchange
Commission, http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/4-461/Jmcritchiel.txt (Mar. 29, 2003, 01:10:00
PST)).
192. STAFF REPORT, supra note 31 (referring to Press Release, SEC, Commission to Review
Current Proxy Rules & Regulations to Improve Corporate Democracy, No. 2003-46 (Apr. 14, 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-46.htm).
c. Call for Public Comment
After receiving the Division's review of the proxy rules and regulations
relating to the nomination of directors, the SEC solicited public views on the
Division's findings in May 2003.'93
i. Comments Encouraging the Proposal of Such a Rule
A great number of commentators urged the SEC to adopt shareholder
access rules, stating that such modifications to the nomination processes
would provide shareholders an effective means of exercising "their rights
and responsibilities as owners of their companies."' 194 Individual investors
stated that the current director nomination process does not provide
shareholders with the rights to which they are entitled as owners of the
company.195 Reform of the proxy rules would make directors more
responsive to shareholder concerns because investors would at last be given
a meaningful position in the oversight of the nomination process.'
96
Commentators also noted that corporate directors lack accountability under
the current nomination process. 97  Furthermore, nominating committees
have not made the nomination process "sufficiently transparent."'198
ii. Comments Discouraging the Proposal of Such a Rule
Commentators opposing modifications to the proxy rules included
corporations and corporate executives, and a majority of the legal
community and associations. 99 It was argued that such a proposal would be
193. See Press Release, SEC, Solicitation of Public Views Regarding Possible Changes to the
Proxy Rules, No. 2003-59 (May 1, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-59.htm.
194. STAFF REPORT, supra note 31.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.; see also E-mail from James McRitchie, Editor, CorpGov.Net, to William Donaldson,
Chairman, United States Securities and Exchange Commission,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/4-461/j mcritchiel.txt (Mar. 29, 2003, 01:10:00 PST) (stating that
"[e]ntrenched managers and directors will only improve corporate governance when they can be
held personally accountable-through the possibility of being voted out of office and replaced by
candidates nominated by shareholders").
198. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No 34-48,626, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,786 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274). Shareholders argue that nominating committees are not
transparent because shareholders are not permitted to access such committees' deliberations.
Murphy, supra note 143, at 95. Further, corporations are not obligated to disclose why a
shareholder-nominated candidate was not listed on a corporate proxy ballot. Sundquist, supra note
144, at 1477.
199. STAFF REPORT, supra note 31.
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"terribly disruptive to the corporate governance process." 200  Instead of
adopting a new rule, the SEC should allow the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
and stock exchange listing standards "a chance to operate before making
such a fundamental change to the director nomination process. 2 0 ' In
addition, commentators questioned the SEC's statutory authority to propose
such a rule, arguing that neither Section 14(a) nor any other statute
authorizes the SEC to regulate matters dealing with corporate governance.20 2
The Supreme Court and lower courts have held that corporate governance is
a topic that is traditionally reserved for states. 203  Commentators stated
further that shareholder access to a company's election processes would
have a harmful effect on a corporation.2°
iii. AFL-CIO Petition to the SEC
The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations ("AFL-CIO") petitioned the SEC on May 15, 2003 to propose
a rule that would allow shareholder-nominated directors to appear on a
company's proxy ballot. 205 The AFL-CIO's petition clarified that only long-
200. Id. (quoting commentator Alston & Bird LLP). Opponents to the rule argue that the
proposed rule will impose a substantial disruption upon shareholder meetings, as it completely
changes the way director candidates are nominated and elected. Silvers & Garland, supra note 15
(manuscript at 7-8). Further, it is maintained that the proposed rule will disrupt the "collegiality" of
the board of directors by introducing shareholder-nominated directors to the board. OLSON &
MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.13.
201. STAFF REPORT, supra note 31 (quoting commentator Alston & Bird LLP).
202. DETAILED COMMENTS OF BRT, supra note 35, at 1.
203. Id. Rules regarding a corporation's shareholder rights are conventionally decided by the state
in which the company is incorporated. Sundquist, supra note 144, at 1496. "Corporations are
creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding
that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation." Id. (quoting Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (emphasis omitted)). Corporate governance has
customarily been left for the states because state law is the creator of the fiduciary duties the board
of directors owes the corporation's shareholders. Interview, supra note 28.
204. SEC, SUMMARY OF COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE COMMISSION'S SOLICITATION OF
PUBLIC VIEWS REGARDING POSSIBLE CHANGES TO THE PROXY RULES app. A at 23 (July 15, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxycomsum.pdf. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a staunch
opponent to the proposed rule, claims that it "will stifle business innovation, decrease productivity
and inhibit economic growth." U.S. Chamber Urges SEC to Drop Proposed Shareholder Access
Rule, supra note 53 (quoting U.S. Chamber of Commerce Senior Vice President David
Hirschmann).
205. Silvers & Garland, supra note 15 (manuscript at 5).
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term shareholders should be permitted to include a candidate on such a
proxy.20 6
d. The Division's Recommendation
The Division provided the SEC with its report after taking
commentators' views into account, and suggested changes to the proxy rules
related to the nomination and election of directors. 20 7  The agency's
recommendation was a triumph for investor-rights advocates, who had
mercilessly campaigned for companies to include shareholder-nominated
candidates along with their own slates of nominees on corporate proxies.20 8
The SEC proposed the Shareholder Director Nomination rule for public
comment in October 2003.209
V. SHAREHOLDER DIRECTOR NOMINATION PROPOSED RULE
A. Objectives of the SEC
The SEC's expressed objective in proposing a shareholder access rule is
to "improve disclosure to security holders to enhance their ability to
participate meaningfully in the proxy process for the nomination and
election of directors" without unduly burdening companies.2
B. Proposed Changes to the Proxy Rule
The proposed rule would operate to require companies,211 under certain
circumstances, to include shareholder-nominated directors for election on
206. Id.
207. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,626, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,786 (proposed Oct.'23, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274). According to the Division, a great deal of the public
recommended that shareholders would be able to effectively participate in the director nomination
process if their nominees were included on the corporate ballot. Id. The Division decided to
propose a rule that would require corporations to place shareholder-nominated candidates for
director on the corporate proxy during circumstances which suggest that companies are unresponsive
to shareholders' concerns regarding the proxy process. Id. at 60,787. The proposed rule further
would be restricted where its operation would conflict with state law or specified events did not
occur. Id.; see STAFF REPORT, supra note 31.
208. Solomon, supra note 12.
209. Silvers & Garland, supra note 15 (manuscript at 6).
210. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,784.
211. The proposed rule would apply to all companies that are subject to the Exchange Act proxy
rules, except those located in states that prohibit shareholders from nominating candidates. Id. at
60,787.
966
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their corporate proxy ballot.21 2 Such circumstances will be triggered only if
there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the company has been
unresponsive to shareholder concerns regarding corporate governance or the
proxy process in general.21 3 If a trigger occurs, then companies are obligated
to include a limited number of investor-elected nominations from
shareholders who meet certain eligibility requirements, without forcing the
nominating shareholders to print and distribute their own proxy materials.
1 4
A significant difference proposed by the SEC, as compared to the
current nomination process, is that the number of director candidates
presented to shareholders for election must be different than the number of
available places on the board.2 5  As a result, each director will be
individually considered for election.1 6
C. Safeguards
The SEC has included several safeguards within the proposed rule that
prevent abuse by shareholders.1 7  Shareholders would be allowed to
nominate only a specific number of directors that could sit on the board at
any one time.21 8 Furthermore, the occurrence of one or both of the two
triggering events would subject a company to shareholder nominations for
only a two-year period. 1 9 In addition, shareholders may only nominate
candidates who are deemed "independent" from the company according to
guidelines established by the SEC. Shareholders may not nominate any
person with whom they would have a conflict of interest.221 Most notably,
shareholders may nominate directors only if those shareholders have no
intention of controlling the company.222  Together, these safeguards
rigorously limit the ability of shareholders to use the triggering of the
proposed rule for their own self-interest. 22
3
212. Id. at 60,784.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. DALY, supra note 133.
216. Id.
217. Garris et al., supra note 24, at 25.
218. Id. This number, currently ranging between one and three, would depend upon the size of
the board. Id. at 27.
219. Id. at25.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
1. Limits on the Number of Shareholder-Nominated Candidates
A company may be required to include one nominee in its proxy
materials if its board consists of eight or fewer members, two nominees if its
board consists of nine to nineteen members, and three nominees for boards
consisting of more than twenty directors.224
If a company receives a number of shareholder-nominated candidates in
excess of these numerical boundaries, the company is required to include in
its proxy materials only the number of directors in the approved limits, as
nominated by the shareholder or shareholder group with the largest
holdings.22 5 If the company has a classified board,226 the limitations on the
number of shareholder nominees would take into account any current
directors who were elected through this procedure but who are not up for re-
election at the current annual meeting. 7
If the SEC adopts the proposed rule, shareholder-nominated candidates
could be elected only by a majority vote.228 If the number of candidates
exceeds the number of available positions on the board of directors,
however, plurality voting would apply.
229
2. Triggering Events
The nominating procedure would become effective for a company only
after the occurrence of one or both of the triggering events.2 3 0  These two
224. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,626, Investment
Company Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,797 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274). Most likely, the Division imposed these limits in order to address
the concerns expressed by commentators in opposition to the proposed rule. See id. at 60,787.
Relevant concerns include the argument that shareholders are not qualified to nominate director
candidates and that shareholders may nominate candidates who support agendas that are not in the
best interests of the corporation. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 80.
225. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,797.
226. A classified board is one in which only a portion of the board of directors is elected each
year. CORP-GOV.ORG, Corporate Governance Glossary, http://www.corp-
gov.org/glossary.php3?glossary-id=24 (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
227. Garris et al., supra note 24, at 27.
228. Bums, supra note 56.
229. SUMMARY OF COMMENTS, supra note 54.
230. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,789-90. It is clear that the SEC
took a "measured" approach when proposing the shareholder director nomination rule. Solomon,
supra note 12. During the SEC's solicitation of public views regarding changes to the proxy
process, the Division received comments that discussed both the considerable benefits of such a
procedure and the significant concerns commentators had regarding its passage, as well as its
potential consequences. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,787. This
proposed rule is intended to deal with the wide-ranging procedural and substantive issues regarding
its operation. Id. By allowing shareholders the right to nominate candidates to a corporation's board
of directors in certain circumstances, the SEC addresses shareholders who complain the corporation
does not listen to their concerns. Solomon, supra note 12. By imposing a triggering requirement
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triggering events are a withhold vote from more than thirty-five percent of
the votes cast at an annual shareholders' meeting, and a shareholder proposal
submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-8 which receives a majority vote in favor of
its passage.2 1  The procedure would then be activated for any annual
meetings or special meetings held during the subsequent two years.232 The
triggers became applicable to activating the shareholder-nomination process
beginning on January 1, 2004, even though the SEC did not adopt the
proposed rule by that date.233
a. Withhold Votes
One trigger for the proposed rule would be "withhold" votes, for at least
one of the company-nominated candidates, from more than thirty-five
percent of the votes cast at a shareholders' annual meeting at which directors
were elected. 34
b. Proposal Submitted Pursuant to Rule 14a-8
Another trigger for the proposed rule would call for a shareholder
"proposal submitted pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 providing that the
company become subject to the security holder nomination procedure. 235
upon the rule's operation, the SEC addresses the proposed rule's opponents who contend that the
proposed rule would be used too frequently, causing disruption, and would be used for purposes
unrelated to improving corporate governance practices. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 80.
231. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,789.
232. Id.
233. OLSON & MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.12 n.51.2. A great majority of commentators
ardently appealed the SEC not to use January 1, 2004 as a "start date" for the triggers, since the
future of the proposed rule is unknown. SUMMARY OF COMMENTS, supra note 54.
234. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,789. "Vote no" campaigns, in
which shareholders withhold votes from one or more nominees for director, have become popular in
recent years for conveying public displeasure with a board of directors. Andrew R. Brownstein &
Igor Kirman, Can a Board Say No When Shareholders Say Yes? Responding to Majority Vote
Resolutions, 60 BUs. LAW. 23, 45-46 (2004). A large number of withhold votes is embarrassing to
the company and the affected directors, and demonstrates a lack of confidence in the board. Id. at
46. A study conducted of the 2004 proxy season revealed that among Russell 1000 companies,
forty-six shareholder meetings contained at least one director receiving withhold votes of thirty-five
percent or more. DALY, supra note 133. Among Russell 2000 companies, sixty-nine shareholder
meetings contained at least one director receiving withhold votes of thirty-five percent or more. Id.
"Vote no" campaigns are strengthened by proxy advisory firms, interet publicity, letters, and phone
calls to shareholders. Brownstein & Kirman, supra at 47.
235. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,789. In a footnote to the proposed
rules, the SEC stated that such proposals will henceforth be allowed to be placed in proxy materials,
even though they relate to election of directors in violation of Rule 14a-8(i)(8). Deborah Solomon,
969
The proposal would have to have been submitted for a shareholder vote at an
annual shareholders' meeting by an investor (or group of investors) that held
more than one percent of the company's securities.236 The trigger would
occur if the "direct access" proposal received more than fifty percent of the
votes cast on the proposal at that meeting. 7
c. Proposed Third Triggering Event: Failure of the Company To
Implement a Shareholder Proposal That Received a Majority
Vote
The SEC is considering a third trigger for the nomination procedure.
This triggering event would require that a shareholder proposal submitted
pursuant to 14a-8, other than a direct access security proposal described in
the second trigger, was submitted for a shareholder vote at an annual
shareholders' meeting by an investor or group of investors that held more
than one percent of the company's securities for at least one year.238 The
trigger would occur if the proposal received more than fifty percent of votes
cast, but the board of directors of the company did not implement the
proposal "by the 120th day prior to the date that the company mailed its
,,219proxy materials for the annual meeting.
3. Candidates Must Meet Independence Standards
A shareholder-nominated candidate for director must meet
independence standards, as set forth in a national securities exchange or
national securities association listing standards. 240 Furthermore, neither the
nominating shareholders nor the nominee may have any direct agreement or
indirect understanding with the company concerning the nomination of the
candidate.2 41  The nominating shareholders must also represent to the
SEC Chief is Open to Revising Rules, Yet Stiff Fines Stay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2005, at A3; see
STAFF REPORT, supra note 31.
236. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,789. The SEC approximates that
most companies have at least one shareholder that is eligible to submit a shareholder proposal under
Rule 14a-8. Id. at 60,790.
237. Id. at 60,792.
238. Id. at 60,791.
239. Id.
240. Garris et al., supra note 24, at 27; INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, supra note 26,
at 10. The audit, nominating, and compensation committees of a corporation were affected by these
rules. As a result of these changes, the NYSE requires independent audit committees and separate
nominating and compensation committees, also composed of solely independent directors. Id.
Under NASDAQ rules, at least a majority of the compensation and nominating committees must be
independent. Id. Both markets require that directors periodically hold meetings without
management present. Id.
241. Garris et al., supra note 24, at 27.
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company that their nominee "does not have certain familial, employment,
compensatory or 'control' relationships with the nominating shareholders,
whether through affiliates or otherwise.
242
4. Nominating-Shareholders' Eligibility Requirements
A shareholder, or group of shareholders, would have to fulfill several
requirements in order to be eligible to place a candidate on the company's
proxy.243
a. Holding Requirements
The nominating shareholder(s) would have to own more than five
percent of the company's outstanding voting stock, either individually or
collectively, and have owned this five percent of outstanding stock
continuously for at least two years prior to the date of nomination.2 4 The
nominating shareholder or group of shareholders must intend to continue to
own the outstanding stock through the date of the annual or special meeting
at which the nomination is to be made.245
b. No Intention of Controlling Company
The nominating shareholder or group of shareholders must also provide
proof that they have no intention of controlling the company.246 This proof
must be provided in two ways.247 The shareholder or each shareholder
within the nominating group (1) must be qualified to "report beneficial
ownership" on Schedule 13G, rather than Schedule 13D; and (2) have filed a
242. Id. A prohibited relationship between the nominee and the nominating shareholder would
include an association in which the nominee would hold the interest of the nominating shareholder
or shareholder group over the interests of the company. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68
Fed. Reg. at 60,795-96. Such nominees are referred to as "special interest" or "single issue." Id. at
60,795.
243. See Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,798. In including these
requirements in the proposed rule, the SEC is ensuring that those shareholders nominating
candidates for the board of directors have interests that are in accordance with those of the
corporation. See id. Shareholders who have demonstrated commitment to the company by owning
more than five percent of the corporation's stock for at least two years are not short-term investors
out for a quick profit. See id. Shareholders who are not out to acquire the corporation are interested
in its long-term growth, since such growth will lead to a profit in their investment. See id.
244. See id. at 60,794-95.
245. Garris et al., supra note 24, at 27.
246. See Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,798.
247. Garris et al., supra note 24, at 27.
Schedule 13G or an amendment to Schedule 13G reporting that beneficial
ownership as a passive or institutional investor, or group of investors, on or
before the date that the nomination(s) for director is submitted to the
company.248
D. Obligations of a Company
A company would be able to reject shareholder nominations if state law
prohibits the proposed rules.2 49  A rejection could also be valid if a
company's governing documents prevent shareholders from nominating
directors, or if the nominating shareholders and/or nominees have not
complied with the requirements set forth in the proposed rules.25° If the
company decides there are no grounds for excluding a nominee, however,
the company would be required to inciude the nominee in the company's
proxy materials, along with any statements Sf support for the candidate, if
the company elects to do SO. 2 5 1 On the 6ompaiy' s proxy card, it may label
any shareholder nominees as such and suggest that shareholders vote against
or withhold votes from those nominees, in favor of the corporate
252nominees.
248. Id. These forms are used in compliance with the Williams Act. SEC, Form Types Used for
Electronic Filing on EDGAR, http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/forms/edgform.pdf (last visited Oct. 9,
2005). When companies register under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, they must comply with
the following requirements: (1) the proxy rules and requirements relating to annual reports to
shareholders; (2) insider trading prohibitions; (3) reports of beneficial ownership; (4) the Williams
Act; and (5) the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Grant W. Collingsworth, The Consequences of
Going Public, http://www.mmmlaw.com/publications/articledetail.asp?serviceid=17&articleid=50
(last visited Feb. 24, 2005). The Williams Act, which now constitutes Rules 13d and 14d of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, was created in 1968 in response to the large number of
unannounced takeovers that occurred in the 1960s. Investopedia.com, Williams Act,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/williamsact.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). These takeovers
created trouble for both investors and corporations. Id. The Williams Act applies to shareholders
owning more than five percent of a corporation. Collingsworth, supra. Shareholders makirg tender
offers to a corporation are required to inclule certain disclosures in Schedule 13D, such as the
identity of the acquiring, shareholder and the purpose of their acquisition. Id. If a shareholder
buying more than five percent of a company's stock is not interested in proposing a tender offer to
the corporation, it is required to file a SchedUle 13G, which discloses information about the
shareholder and the extent of its acquisition. Id.
249. Garris et al., supra note 24, at 27; see also Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 60,784 (noting that "[t]he proposed rules would not provide security holders with the right to
nominate directors where it is prohibited by state law.").
250. Garris et al., supra note 24, at 28.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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E. Authority Under Federal Law
Section 14, described in Part III, "was intended to 'control the
conditions under which proxies. may be solicited with a view to preventing
the recurrence of abuses which ... [had] frustrated the free exercise of the
voting rights of security holders.' 25 3 Section 14(a) authorizes the SEC to
impose proxy solicitation rules that are "necessary or appropriate, in the
public interest or for the protection of investors. 25 4
The SEC believes that the proposed rule advances the objectives of
Section 14.255 Investors are prevented from participating meaningfully in the
proxy process because of the lack of methods available to them to contribute
to nomination proceedings.256 Although the director candidates nominated
by the current board or nominating committee are often not the most
qualified to represent the shareholders' interests,2 57 shareholders are forced
to vote for these candidates.2 8  The proposed rule's passage will aid
shareholders in freely exercising their voting rights through the proxy
process, since companies would be required to disclose shareholder
nominees in company proxy materials in certain circumstances.259
F. State Law
State laws and federal laws regulate different aspects of corporate
processes.260  Federal proxy rules, as enacted by the SEC, regulate
disclosure.26' State laws govern procedural rules and corporate governance
253. BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 14 (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964)
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 1383, at 13-14 (1933))).
254. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2000)).
255. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,626, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60786 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274).
256. The director slate is proposed entirely by the board of directors or the nominating committee,
and shareholders are permitted to approve all directors, withhold their support from all directors, or
approve only some directors. DALY, supra note 133. The current methods a shareholder can use to
nominate their own director candidate are often costly and ineffective. See BRIEFING PAPER, supra
note 14.
257. See Murphy, supra note 143, at 95. Boards nominate directors "in an informal and
unregulated manner." Id.
258. Matheson & Olson, supra note 125, at 1361 n.231. Investors "tend to vote for management
because assertive shareholders encounter management hostility. Managers can deny rebellious
shareholders valuable information." Id. (quoting Dent, supra note 125, at 904).
259. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,786.
260. Interview, supra note 28.
261. Id.
standards.262 While states recognize that "the 'right of shareholders to
participate in the voting process includes the right to nominate an opposing
slate,' ' 263 no state law operates similarly to the proposed rule.
Due to the lobbying efforts of shareholders to become more involved in
the director nomination processes, the California legislature introduced a bill
that "go[es] further" than the proposed rule.264 This bill would require any
companies doing business in the state to permit nominations by investors
who have held at least two percent of the company's outstanding stock for
two years to appear on the corporate proxy.265 Vermont introduced a bill
that would allow a voting shareholder to have its director nominees placed
on the corporate proxy statement as long as the shareholder provides
appropriate notice to the corporation, if the corporation so requires.
VI. PROXY ENVIRONMENT POST-PROPOSAL
Despite the fact that the SEC has not yet adopted the proposed rule, the
introduction of the topic has considerably influenced the corporate
environment, particularly the 2004 proxy season.267
262. Id. Examples of procedural rules would be laws governing shareholders' meetings (time and
place), or whether a director is elected by a plurality or a majority of votes. Id.
263. Harrah's Entm't, Inc. v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294, 310 (Del. Ch. 2002) (citing Linton
v. Everett, No. 15219, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117, at *29 (Del. Ch. July 31, 1997)).
264. Solomon & Lublin, supra note 5. The California legislature's position as a supporter of the
proposed rule is surprising, as states are expected to act in the interests of corporations in order to
encourage companies to incorporate in their state. See Interview, supra note 28. However,
California has become an advocate of the SEC's proposed rule because of the negative effect that
corporate scandals of such companies as Enron and WorldCom have had on investor confidence.
Assemb. J. Res. 79, 2004 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004). California believes that urgent
improvements to corporate governance practices are needed in order to "achiev[e] greater
accountability" for boards of directors. Id. The proposed rule, in California's opinion, will
accomplish such an objective. Id. Despite this hope, Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed the bill on
September 22. 2004. Official California Legislative Information, AB 2752 Assembly Bill - History,
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab-2751-2800/ab_2752_bill_20040922_history.html
(last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
265. Assemb. B. 2752, 2004 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004). California is a vocal advocate
of the SEC's proposed rule, stating that its passage would "answer the call for badly needed reform."
Assemb. J. Res. 79, 2004 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004). California's action in introducing
this bill is significant because it is indicative of the proposed rule's wide-spread support. See id. It
shows that the proposed rule's passage will benefit all shareholders, not merely those who are
pushing a personal agenda, as some opponents claim. See Phyllis Plitch, Activist Evelyn Davis Sides
With CEOs On SEC Proxy Rule, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Dec. 23, 2003,
http://online.wsj.com/article/O,,BTCO_20031223-004601,00.html.
266. H.B. 716, 68th Gen. Assemb., Biennial Sess. (Vt. 2005). If a corporation does require notice
of intent to nominate director candidates, this notice cannot exceed the name of the nominating
shareholder and the number of shares owned by this shareholder. Id.
267. OLSON & MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.12.
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A. How Often Have the Proposed Rule Requirements Been Met?
1. One Percent Ownership Threshold for Submission of Proposal
Approximations by the SEC indicate that most companies have at least
one shareholder that is eligible to submit a shareholder proposal under Rule
14a-8, one of the proposed rule's triggers.268 Of companies that are listed on
a national exchange or quoted on the NASDAQ stock market, the SEC
estimates that eighty-four percent have at least one shareholder that has
maintained ownership of at least one percent of the outstanding shares for
one year.269
2. Five Percent Ownership Threshold for Director Nomination
The SEC indicated "that roughly [forty-two percent] of [companies]
have at least one shareholder that can meet this threshold, while roughly
[fifty percent] of [companies] have two or more shareholders" who have
aggregately owned this amount for the appropriate holding period of two
years.27 °
3. Thirty-Five Percent Withhold Vote
Campaigns to withhold votes, often called "vote-no" campaigns, were
particularly popular in the 2004 proxy season. z7  Automatic Data
Processing, Inc. ("ADP"), a products and services company that handles
recordkeeping, 2 conducted a study of 2836 companies between June 2003
and January 2004 concerning "the number of directors within Russell 3000
companies that had a [thirty-five percent] or greater withhold vote. 273
Among Russell 1000 companies, ADP identified forty-six meetings at which
at least one director received withhold votes of 35% or more.274 Of these
forty-six meetings, a total of seventy-six directors received withhold votes of
268. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,626, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,786 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274).
269. Id. at 60,790.
270. Silvers & Garland, supra note 15 (manuscript at 14-15).
271. OLSON & MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.12.
272. ADP, ADP Overview, http://www.adp.com/corporate/adp-corpoverview-main.html (last
visited Jan. 31, 2005).
273. DALY, supra note 133.
274. Id.
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35% or more.275 Among Russell 2000 companies, ADP identified sixty-nine
meetings at which at least one director received withhold votes of 35% or
more.276  Of these sixty-nine meetings, a total of 137 directors received
withhold votes of 35% or more.277
The causes for withhold votes were numerous, "ranging from board
independence to the company's failure to implement past majority votes., 278
In several instances, companies implemented governance reforms
subsequent to vote-no campaigns.279
Several examples illustrate the strength of these campaigns.
Shareholders of Federated Department Stores ("Federated") responded to
repeatedly ignored majority votes280 by withholding from director Joseph
Neubauer 61% of votes cast at an annual meeting.28' Votes were withheld
also from three other Federated directors that were up for reelection.282
The vote-no campaign against Michael Eisner, Chairman and CEO of
Walt Disney Company ("Disney"), is described as the "most dramatic" of
the proxy season,283 with 45%284 of votes being withheld over the issue of
board independence. 285  Disney swiftly responded to the withhold vote by
replacing Eisner with George Mitchell.286
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. Despite appearances, these numbers constitute relatively few of the thousands of director
elections that proxy season. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, supra note 26, at 5.
278. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, supra note 26, at 6.
279. OLSON & MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.12.
280. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, supra note 26, at 6. The company ignored
declassification proposals that had received majority votes for five years, maintaining "that a
classified Board provides for continuity and stability and enhances the Board's ability to implement
its long-term strategy and to focus on long-term performance." Id. at 9 (internal quotation omitted).
281. Phyllis Plitch, Tracking the Numbers / What's Hot... and Not: Despite Disney, Proxy Wars
Were Few, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2004, at C3. A "vote-no" campaign was not organized by either
shareholders or a proxy advisory service in this case. Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 234, at 51.
Commentators theorized that the high withhold vote which resulted in the Federated annual meeting
was a consequence of "the absence of an organized 'Vote No' campaign," which in turn led to the
absence of a counter-campaign by management. Id.
282. Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 234, at 51. These withhold votes were also the result of
Federated's failure to respond to majority votes. Id.
283. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, supra note 26, at 24.
284. The forty-five percent withhold vote is a revision of the previously calculated forty-two
percent withhold vote. Id. at 5.
285. Id. at 6. During Disney's 2004 shareholders' meeting, shareholders condemned the company
because of its "financial performance,... corporate governance and.., lack of a succession plan."
Merissa Marr, Disney Dissident Ex-Directors Pressure Board Over CEO Search, WALL ST. J., Feb.
9, 2005, at B9. Pension fund CalPERS stated that it withheld support from CEO Michael Eisner
during his 2004 re-election bid because "it had 'lost confidence' in his ability to create shareholder
value." Walt Disney Co.: Calpers to Withhold Support For CEO Eisner's Re-Election, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 10, 2005, at A9.
286. OLSON & MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.12.
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The vote-no campaign against Coca-Cola audit committee member
Warren Buffett was well publicized, but resulted in a withhold vote of
between 10 and 20% over the issue of audit committee independence.287
At Safeway, shareholders accused the board of participating in
transactions with third parties with whom it was affiliated, leading to
conflicts of interest that benefited directors.288 Arguing that the charges
were "politically motivated," Safeway demonstrated the company's
unyielding position with an extended labor dispute.289 The very public vote-
no campaign produced a withhold vote of 17% against Chairman and CEO
Steve Burd.290  As a result, the company announced "major corporate
governance enhancements" to strengthen board independence and execute
all investor proposals receiving a majority vote.29'
The AFL-CIO, Communications Workers of America, and the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers announced a vote-no
campaign against Comcast CEO Brian Roberts and director S. Decker
Anstrom at the company's annual meeting.292 The labor groups criticized
Roberts for sitting on both the nominating committee and the board of
directors, and accused Anstrom of conflicts of interest. 293 The board of
directors of Comcast inserted a motion on the company's proxy requesting
that shareholders vote to amend the articles of incorporation to ensure that
Roberts may resign from the nominating committee, the nomination process
is reformed so that it requires the approval of all board members, and the
committee consequently becomes wholly independent.294  Shareholders
voted to re-elect both Roberts and Anstrom, with both receiving the support
of more than 90% of votes cast.
29 5
A few companies commenced reforms without facing vote-no
campaigns.296 Boise Cascade and General Electric Company both elected to
establish independent lead directors.297 Praxair Inc. requested shareholders
approve a replacement for the anti-takeover measure that the board had
287. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, supra note 26, at 6.
288, Id. at 26.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. OLSON & MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.12.
292. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, supra note 26, at 25.
293, Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 5.
297. OLSON & MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.12.
terminated, which resulted in the proposal winning the support of 77.5% of
the votes cast. 98
B. Decreased Number of Proxy Fights in 2004
A decrease in the number of shareholder proposals, 299 together with an
increase in voluntary action on behalf of the company, was a noticeable
pattern during the 2004 proxy season.300  Shareholders withdrew their
proposals to declassify particular corporations' boards when at least fifty
companies voluntarily proposed to do the same. 30 1 Merck & Co. took such
an action after shareholder proposals to declassify its board, on the corporate
proxy for five years, finally received a majority vote from shareholders.3 2
Shareholder proposals regarding board declassification at Lucent
Technologies received the corporation's attention after the proposals
garnered majority support for the past three years.30 3
Shareholder proposals that requested investors be afforded the
opportunity to nominate directors received mixed support from
corporations.
304
In February 2004, a shareholder proposal at Qwest Communications
sought to provide proxy access for particular shareholder-nominated
candidates for director.305 Qwest sought counsel from the SEC, and the SEC
ruled "that Qwest could not omit the proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(8). 3 °6
Later, the SEC reconsidered its position and issued Qwest a no-action letter,
stating that it would not recommend enforcement action if the company
298. Id. (internal citation omitted).
299. The 2004 proxy season was characterized by an increase in communication between
shareholders and corporations. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, supra note 26, at 3.
"Satisfied that their concerns were being [addressed,] shareholders withdrew a number of
proposals." Id.
300. OLSON & MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.12.
301. Id. (internal citations omitted).
302. Id. (internal citations omitted).
303. Id. (internal citations omitted).
304. The refusal of some companies, such as Qwest and Disney, to implement shareholder access
proposals is consistent with opponents' arguments that the SEC has no legal authority to implement
such a proposal. See Solomon, supra note 17. These actions are indicative of the strong opposition
to passage that the proposed rule faces among corporations. SUMMARY OF COMMENTS, supra note
54. Despite this opposition, some companies are acting in favor of the proposed rule, such as Marsh
& McLellan. Solomon & Lublin, supra note 5. These corporations' decisions are significant
because they are examples of the recent trend among corporations to adopt versions of the proposed
rule, even in the absence of the rule's passage and a legal requirement to do so. See OLSON &
MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.12; see also Plitch, supra note 42 (providing examples of corporations
that have adopted shareholder access proposals as part of a shareholder litigation settlement:
Ashland Inc., MCI Inc., and Hanover Compressor Co.).
305. OLSON & MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.12.
306. Id.
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omitted the proposal from its proxy materials.3 °7 Its reassessment was based
on an examination of the company's view, which it ultimately supported,
"that it may exclude the proposal where the proposal's definition of
'qualified shareholder' differs from the [shareholder] eligibility standard" of
the proposed rule.3 °8
Four pension funds, among them AFSCME, with a combined holding of
1.3 percent in Marsh & McLellan, presented a proposal to its- board
requesting that they be permitted to nominate its directors.30 9 In March
2004, the company agreed to nominate a former federal prosecutor recruited
by the pension fund group.310 Subsequently, the institutional investors
agreed to drop their proposal.3 1 ' Richard Ferlauto, a pension fund official,
said that the pending SEC rule "is what brought the company to the
table."
, 312
The Division reversed a decision it made in December 2004, allowing
Walt Disney Company ("Disney") to omit from its proxy a resolution
adopted at an annual meeting that allowed shareholders to nominate board of
director candidates. 1 3 Originally, the Division told Disney to include the
proposal on the ballot. 14  This decision was considered a success for
shareholder activists, 31I since the SEC normally sides with management in
such cases.3 16 After Disney appealed the Division's decision to the SEC's
five commissioners, the Division reversed its pronouncement and stated it
307. Id.
308. Id. (internal citation omitted).
309. Solomon & Lublin, supra note 5.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Bruce Orwall & Deborah Solomon, SEC Says Disney Can Exclude Shareholder Resolution
After All, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2004, at C4.
314. Richard Verrier & Jonathan Peterson, Disney Investor Proposal Gets a Boost From SEC,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2004, at Cl. The proposal was submitted by such prominent institutional
investors as CalPERS, the New York State Common Retirement Fund, the AFSCME, and the
Illinois State Board of Investment. Phyllis Plitch, SEC Staff Clears Proxy Proposal of Disney
Holders, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2004, at B6.
315. This proposal was greatly influenced by shareholders' frustration with Disney's Chairman
and CEO Michael Eisner. Verrier & Peterson, supra note 314. At a shareholders' annual meeting in
March 2004, Eisner received a forty-five percent withhold vote from shareholders. Id. He was
stripped of his title as Chairman, and soon resigned. Id. Although shareholders were pleased by the
affirmative action Disney took with regard to Eisner, they were aggravated by the fact that the board
rejected three people shareholders had recommended for director candidates. Id.
316. Id. "The staff has said for a long time that these types of proposals... don't have to be
included," said an SEC staff member. Id. In this instance, however, the SEC was influenced by the
proposed rule. Id.
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would not seek enforcement should Disney exclude the proposal from its
proxy materials. 17 While the Division declined to be more specific about
why its staff reversed its decision,318 the staff may have been concerned that
the proposal did not resemble the proposed rule closely enough. 31 9  Four
pension funds have asked the SEC to reconsider its position.320
VII. POINTS OF CONTROVERSY
A significant majority of commentators supported the proposed rules. 32 1
The exceptions were corporations, corporate executives, corporate directors,
law firms, attorneys, and most business associations.322 Some investors were
critical of the rule if they believed it did not go far enough in addressing
current corporate governance complaints.323
317. Orwall & Solomon, supra note 313.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Walt Disney Co.: Public Pension Funds Ask SEC To Revisit Disney Proxy Opinion, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 30, 2004, at B2. Richard Ferlauto, AFSCME's director of pension investment policy,
said that AFSCME was disappointed but will continue to pursue change. Orwall & Solomon, supra
note 313. "If any company was deserving of proxy access coming out of the 2004 proxy season,"
Mr. Ferlauto said, "it was Disney, and they're off the hook." Id.
321. The SEC received comments from more than 16,000 people and organizations, which is the
largest response to a proposed rule it has ever received. CONGRESS WATCH, supra note 1, at 10.
Most of the commentators favored the proposed rule. Id. (citing Carrie Johnson, SEC Chairman
Under Pressure on Proxy Plan, WASH. POST, June 8, 2004; Joseph McCafferty, Proposed SEC
Rules on 'Proxy Access' Generated the Most Comment Letters Ever Received by the Commission,
June 22, 2004, http://www.CFO.com). The majority of commentators most likely approved of the
proposed rule because of the effect that the recent accounting scandals have had on investor
confidence. Solomon & Lublin, supra note 5; see also Assemb. J. Res. 79, 2004 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004). Investors believe that the only way to improve corporate accountability is to
reform the proxy process. See OLSON & MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.13.
322. SUMMARY OF COMMENTS, supra note 54. Opponents, such as corporations, corporate
executives, and corporate directors, are most likely threatened by the proposed rule because it would
allow shareholders to circumvent their power in limited circumstances. See Security Holder Director
Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,626, Investment Company Act No. 26,206, 68 Fed.
Reg. 60,784, 60,784 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274). In
addition, shareholders would be able to hold corporate directors accountable for the failures of the
corporation by withholding votes for their re-election. See, e.g., Marr, supra note 285 (describing
2004's withhold vote against Disney CEO Michael Eisner). These reasons are strong factors in the
disagreement between proponents and opponents of the proposed rule: while shareholders would
receive power in limited circumstances by being allowed to place their director nominees on a
corporate ballot, corporate directors would lose power by no longer controlling the nomination
process. See Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,784.
323. Solomon, supra note 17. Some commentators believe that the proposed rule is too limiting,
and that a withhold vote trigger of twenty percent is more appropriate than one of thirty-five percent:
a twenty percent trigger, it is argued, "is still a very high withhold level in terms of historic results of
'vote no' campaigns, but it is a level of withholds that has been achieved in a handful of cases."
Silvers & Garland, supra note 15 (manuscript at 17).
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A. SEC Has No Legal Authority To Promulgate Rules Governing
Shareholder Access To the Issuer's Proxy Materials
Opponents argue that the SEC has no legal authority to promulgate the
proposed rule, since it is a matter of corporate governance and is a topic
traditionally reserved for the states. 32 4  Corporate governance has
customarily been left to the states because state law is the creator of the
fiduciary duties the board of directors owes the corporation's
shareholders.3"5 Consequently, the board of directors has the unique role of
designating director candidates because its discretion is limited by its
fiduciary duties to the company and its shareholders, while shareholders may
nominate director candidates for self-serving reasons.326
According to these opinions, the SEC does not cite any statutory
327provisions that authorize it to regulate corporate governance.
Commissioner Paul Atkins has presented this argument as well, asking
"[w]hat authority does the SEC have to regulate the nomination and
selection of corporate directors in this way?",3 28  Stephen Bokat, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce's general counsel, argued the proposed rule is "an
overreaction" on the part of the SEC.329 He continued, "Our concern is that
they're going far beyond what they have authority to do and what the statute
in these rule makings provides., 330  Opponents fear the passage of the
proposed rule would make federal intrusion into and control over the
operation of state-chartered companies acceptable.
31
In response to this argument, it is necessary to emphasize that "Section
14(a) authorizes the [SEC] to prescribe proxy solicitation rules that are
'necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
324. Business groups did not challenge the SEC's authority to regulate corporate governance
when it created the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 because of the public outcry against the corporate
accounting scandals of that time. Interview, supra note 28. At present, as the number of scandals
declines, opponents challenge the authority of the SEC to impose the proposed rule. Solomon &
Schroeder, supra note 28.
325. Interview, supra note 28.
326. Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 32, at 7.
327. DETAILED COMMENTS OF BRT, supra note 35.
328. Id. (quoting Commissioner Paul S. Atkins during Open Meeting of the Securities and
Exchange Commission on October 8, 2003).
329. Solomon & Schroeder, supra note 28.
330. Id.
331. DETAILED COMMENTS OF BRT, supra note 35.
investors.' 332 Management and boards are often loyal to each other and not
to shareholders, as evidenced by the implementation of resolutions that
protect their interests over shareholders' wishes.33 3  Board narrow-
mindedness remains common.334 Therefore, the best method of avoiding
another scandal like Enron and ensuring proper corporate governance is to
implement an "open market for corporate control. 335  Former Chairman
Donaldson commented that the proposed rule, by "[m]aking it easier for
dissatisfied shareholders to nominate [director] candidates," will help stop
corporate fraud and provoke executives to act in shareholders' interests.336
As such, the goals of Section 14(a) are realized. Although the proposed rule
intrudes upon an area that has customarily been reserved for states, the SEC
expressly states that the shareholder access rule will not apply to those states
in which it is prohibited.337
B. Scandal Is Not the Norm
Opponents argue further that corporate fraud and dishonesty is not
characteristic of the vast majority of corporate managers, despite the hugely
publicized scandals in recent history.338 By and large, managers and boards
are dedicated to their shareholders and are incredibly motivated to work
towards the success of their corporations.339
Despite this claim, revelations of corporate fraud continue.340
University of Texas securities law professor Henry Hu stated that
"[e]xecutives who are trying to roll back some of these reforms are going to
end up looking somewhat premature. 34' Even with the additional
restrictions provided by the proposed rule, the degree of reform "would not
be disproportionate to the magnitude" of the alleged abuses.343
332. Id. (citing Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,626,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,786 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2000)).
333. Editorial, The People v. PeopleSoft, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 26, 2004, at A8. For example,
PeopleSoft's board implemented anti-takeover provisions without seeking investors' approval. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Solomon & Lublin, supra note 5.
337. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,784.
338. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 80.
339. Id.
340. Solomon & Schroeder, supra note 28.
341. Id.
342. Bebchuk, supra note 8, at 60.
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C. Potential Costs of the Rule Outweigh Its Benefits
Opponents claim that the direct costs of the rule, which include
increased proxy disclosure, services of outside professionals, and
expenditures of an election contest,343 are far greater than the potential
benefits.3 " Shareholders, too, would be forced to expend costly resources in
order to prepare and file the appropriate certifications for submitting a
candidate for nomination.345
In making this argument, opponents underestimate the potential benefits
of the proposed rule. Its adoption would align the interests of the board and
security holders, thereby giving investors greater confidence that the board is
serving the interest of security holders, even if the provisions of the rule are
rarely used.346  The presence of triggering events may improve the
responsiveness of boards to security holders' requests. 347 The benefits of the
passage of the proposed rule "should not be measured by the number of
shareholder-nominated directors that would be elected," but by "the effect
that shareholders' greater power would have on the incentives of directors
and nominating committees. 34t
D. Risk of an Influx of Special Interest Directors
Opponents maintain that special interest groups are likely to be most
active in seeking to nominate director candidates if the proposed rule is
adopted.349  For instance, labor unions may threaten to trigger the
shareholder nominating procedure as a component in their collective
bargaining strategy or to gain power over boards in order to press forward
343. The costs related to an election contest include "executive and director time and distraction
from performance of their regular duties, other company personnel time and distraction from normal
duties, legal fees, and the expenses of professional proxy solicitors." DETAILED COMMENTS OF
BRT, supra note 35, at 55.
344. See Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,626, Investment
Company Act No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,786-87 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274); see also Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 83-84 ("Fighting
an election contest ... impos[es] significant monetary costs for the printing and mailing of proxy
materials and supplements and the assistance of outside advisors.").
345. DETAILED COMMENTS OF BRT, supra note 35, at 55.
346. See Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,813.
347. See id. "Board unresponsiveness is sometimes tied to governance weaknesses." Solomon,
supra note 17 (quoting SEC Chairman William Donaldson).
348. Bebchuk, supra note 8, at 51.
349. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 78-79.
certain objectives.35° Political pressures may prejudice public pension
funds.35' Furthermore, taking into account that "the primary point of these
proposals is to make running an election contest far easier than it is today, it
is inevitable that if the proposals are adopted, the rate at which dissident and
special interest directors are nominated and elected will be far greater than it
is today. 352  If such a "special interest" candidate is elected, then that
shareholder nominee will advocate a particular policy objective over the
well being of the corporation.353
Despite these fears, proponents of the proposed rule argue that most
institutional investors cannot be expected to initiate their own slate of
directors because money managers are "reluctant activists. 354 Institutional
investors concentrate on security trading and portfolio management; they are
unlikely to spend valuable management time focusing on one corporation's
dubious corporate governance practices, especially since doing so might
expose the institutional investors to the risk of company retaliation or
litigation.355 In addition, private money managers tend to vote against
company management only in cases of a takeover when it appears that
management is acting in its own self-interest; past voting patterns suggest
that private money managers vote with management when social issues are
on the ballot.35 6 This precedent signifies that, "although shareholder access
would not lead to the election of shareholder-nominated directors who run
on a social agenda or represent special interests, it would occasionally lead
to the election of such directors when incumbents' performance is especially
poor and the election of these directors" promises increased shareholder
value.357
350. Id. at 78. If institutional investors represent special interest groups, these investors will have
the ability to activate the triggering events because of their large holdings, and will eagerly do so.
See Evelyn Y. Davis, Do the Right Thing, Mr. Donaldson, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2004, at B2.
However, even if the proposed rule is adopted and it is triggered, shareholder-nominated candidates
must be elected by a majority of shareholders, which will ensure that a great deal of investors
support the nominee and believe that the nominee's qualifications will serve as a valuable asset to
the corporation. See Bums, supra note 56.
351. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 78.
352. Id. at 83.
353. DETAILED COMMENTS OF BRT, supra note 35, at 40. "There are lots of special interests that
will try to use the rule as leverage to further their own agenda," says Stephen Odland, chief
executive of AutoZone, Inc. "That will divert attention from serving the interests of all
shareholders." Solomon & Lublin, supra note 5.
354. Bebchuk, supra note 8, at 50 (quoting Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Investors: Reluctant
Activists, HARV. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 140, 140).
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
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E. Triggers Will be Used Frequently
Challengers of the proposed rule assert that if the proposed rule is
adopted, the triggers will be activated far more often than the SEC
anticipates 358 and the triggering party may have incentives irrelevant to the
proxy process or the corporate candidate. 359 As such, the triggers will be a
defective indicator of a corporation's responsiveness to shareholders, and in
conflict with the SEC's objectives in the proposed rule's passage. 360
In reality, the shareholder nomination procedure, if adopted, would be
used very rarely.36' Institutional investors, such as union and state pension
funds, own such a minor portion of the vast majority of corporations that
their holdings are unlikely to influence a shareholder vote, much less
guarantee the enactment of a shareholder access proposal. 62 Consequently,
no evidence suggests that proxy wars will become frequent after the passage
of the proposed rule; rather, election contests will take place in the few
companies where shareholder dissatisfaction was widespread enough to
result in a considerable withhold vote, or majority support on a shareholder
proposal for access.
363
358. DETAILED COMMENTS OF BRT, supra note 35, at 40. The SEC anticipates that the triggers
will be activated only in those instances where evidence suggests that the company has been
unresponsive to security holder concerns as they relate to the proxy process. Security Holder
Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,626, Investment Company Act Release No.
26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,784 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,
249, 274).
359. DETAILED COMMENTS OF BRT, supra note 35, at 35. In support, opponents have claimed
that proponents of the proposed rule have "practically acknowledged" that they would activate the
triggers if they saw an opportunity to advance their own special interests, even if they are unrelated
to the interests of the corporation as a whole. Id. at 31. Such special interests may include political
pressures or, for labor unions, union-related objectives. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 78.
For example, Sean Harrigan, former president of CalPERS, was criticized for using his high rank at
CaIPERS to support the cause of a union, of which he was a senior executive, while it was in the
midst of a labor strike against Safeway, Inc. Jim Carlton & Jonathan Weil, Moving the Market:
Ouster isn't Expected to Alter Calpers Policy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2004, at C3. In addition, a seat
on the CalPERS board is viewed as an excellent starting point for a person "seeking to run for state
political office." Editorial, Canned at Calpers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2004, at A12.
360. DETAILED COMMENTS OF BRT, supra note 35, at 27-28.
361. THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET, supra note 27 (quoting Beth Young, Senior Research
Analyst, TheCorporateLibrary.com and Corporate Governance Consultant).
362. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Business Roundtable's Untenable Case Against Shareholder
Access 7 (Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 516, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=686184.
363. Bebchuk, supra note 8, at 52.
F. Creation of an Adversarial Relationship Between Directors and
Shareholders
Opponents claim that the proposed rule threatens to lead to
confrontation, rather than cooperation, between shareholders and incumbent
boards.3 64 Its passage would have the effect of uniting a corporation's
directors and managers in a "defensive alliance" against shareholders, the
perceived threat.3 65 An adversarial relationship between the groups will not
lead to more effective corporate governance.366
This argument may be well founded, but it is time to provide the
corporate investor with a means to fairly and democratically affect ballots.
367
California State Treasurer Philip Angelides remarked that "[n]o boards of
directors or management should have a fear of directors being elected to the
board that get a majority of shareholder votes. 368
G. Risk of Balkanized and Dysfunctional Boards
Challengers claim that this new nomination opportunity and the
selection of shareholder-nominated directors could divide the board of
directors into two factions: (1) those nominated by the corporate nominating
committee in order to represent all shareholders; and (2) those placed by-
and more loyal to-particular shareholder interest groups, such as pension
funds or labor unions.369 This "balkanization" will prevent the board from
operating productively and collegially as a group.370 In order for the board
to perform its duties effectively, the corporation's directors must mutually
respect and trust one another.
[I]t is simply human nature for an executive to respond differently
in a relationship of mutual respect than in an adversarial
relationship. In the latter situation, the information will be
formulated and packaged more defensively and more formally in an
364. Grundfest, supra note 55 (manuscript at 3).
365. Georgeson Shareholder, Re: Security Holder Director Nominations (Dec. 12, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/georgeson 21203.htm.
366. Grundfest, supra note 55 (manuscript at 3).
367. Pamela Atkins, SEC Access Proposal Seen as Dead; Some Shift Focus to Requiring Majority
Vote, 37 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 230, 73 (Feb. 7, 2005), available at 37 SEC. REG. L. REP.
(BNA) 230 (LEXIS).
368. Carpenter & McTague, supra note 14, at 948.
369. Olson & Adams, supra note 37, at 440.
370. Id. at 423. As a result of this balkanization, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Senior Vice
President David Hirschmann said that the proposal "is not good governance and will have
unintended consequences that will stifle business innovation, decrease productivity and inhibit
economic growth." U.S. Chamber Urges SEC to Drop Proposed Shareholder Access Rule, supra
note 53.
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effort to fend off the perceived possibility that it will be used to
attack management rather than to assist them. Second, executives
are far more likely to listen to advice from directors they respect
and trust than from directors they view as adversaries .... Third, it
is far more likely that the directors themselves will be able to work
with each other to assist corporate decision-making if they respect
and trust one another. In this environment, directors will feel
comfortable discussing and debating the merits of business
decisions, opportunities, and corporate policy and direction. In an
environment where the directors are divided into warring factions,
this kind of open discussion and debate simply does not take
place.37'
These arguments are based on the perception "that collegiality among
directors should be preserved regardless of the consequences to the
corporation and its shareholders. 372  A friendly and effective working
relationship between directors is important, but a board's most important
function is to be a successful supervisor of management.373 The public
would be much better off today if the boards of Enron and WorldCom had
been "less collegial and more willing to challenge their CEOs with
uncomfortable questions . . . . Directors must be willing to challenge
management to ensure that management's business strategy is in the long-
term interests of the corporation and its shareholders, and that management
is effectively executing that strategy and managing risk., 3 74
H. Risk of Deterring the Most Skilled Men and Women from Serving on
Public Company Boards
According to opponents, an increase in the incidence of election
contests-a natural consequence of the passage of the proposed rule-will
intensify the struggles that have already arisen3 75 in attracting and retaining
371. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 81.
372. Silvers & Garland, supra note 15 (manuscript at 7).
373. Id.
374. Id. An example of such a challenge would be directors denying demands for excessive
compensation by CEOs, who are also board members. Id.
375. The problems related to being a director in a publicly held corporation are numerous. Lipton
& Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 86. The prestige of being a director has been tarnished by corporate
scandals. Id. The corporate governance reforms that have been implemented recently require the
board of directors to comply with a number of procedures that require both money and time. Id. In
addition, recent court decisions have placed an additional burden on directors: perceived increased
liability for wrongs committed against shareholders. See id.
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talented directors in publicly held corporations.37 6 These potential directors,
who are generally not in need of the position because of their previous
successes,
377 will not want to participate in an election contest.
378
Although this argument may have merit, it is too rash to say that
shareholder access to the proxy ballot will diminish the appeal of holding the
title of director, a position that is both prestigious and well-paid.379 Even
with shareholder access to the nomination procedures, directors would face a
relatively small likelihood of removal. ° If evidence suggested that
shareholder participation discouraged qualified individuals from seeking
these positions, shareholders can counteract this consequence by offering
directors greater compensation.381
In addition, newly elected directors having a greater commitment to
shareholders than to other directors would "psychologically make an
enormous difference," said Harvard Law School Professor Reinier
Kraakman. 382  "You would have a much better motivated and more able
cadre of directors. 383 Improving the selection and incentives for directors
would positively affect corporate value.384
I. Investors Are Not Well Suited to Nominate
Opponents to the proposed rule claim that investors are not well suited
to nominate director candidates for three reasons: (1) this function is not the
expertise of institutional investors; (2) institutional investors have their own
corporate governance problems; and (3) institutional investors do not
adequately reflect the needs of the shareholders.
By investing in a company, shareholders have also invested in the skills
of the existing directors, who are entrusted with making decisions that
reflect the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.385
Institutional investors are skilled in money management and financial
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. DETAILED COMMENTS OF BRT, supra note 35, at 43.
379. Bebchuk, supra note 8, at 54. Recent evidence would suggest that the threat of the proposed
rule is not having the effect of repelling candidates. Martin Dunn, deputy director of the Division of
Corporation Finance, stated that out of the 150 proxy statements he's analyzed, less than five percent
of directors were not seeking election. Atkins, supra note 367.
380. Bebchuk, supra note 8, at 54.
381. Id.
382. Phyllis Plitch, Corporate Governance (A Special Report), WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at R3.
383. Id.
384. Bebchuk, supra note 8, at 53.
385. DETAILED COMMENTS OF BRT, supra note 35, at 25.
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analysis; directors, on the other hand, are trained to analyze how best to
manage the business operations of the corporation.386
Institutional investors have been criticized for advocating causes that are
not directly related to the objective of striving for optimum investment
returns.3 87  CalPERS, for example, has been criticized for interfering with
issues that have ambiguous relationships with increasing shareholder
returns, 388 such as political 389 and labor-union matters. 390  TIAA-CREF is
involved in a corporate governance scandal, prompted by two trustees'
improper business deal391 with outside auditor Ernst & Young LLP ("Ernst
& Young"). 392 Although "[c]orporate-govemance activists long have pushed
for companies to disclose any significant bad news as early and widely as
possible, 393 these trustees did not disclose their relationship with the auditor
on their officer-and-trustee questionnaires for 2003 or 2004, which
contained questions about whether either had an affiliation with Ernst &
Young. 9 4
Shareholder activist Evelyn Davis395 claims that the adoption of the
proposed rule would "disenfranchise" smaller shareholders. 6 She argues
386. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 77.
387. Weil & Lublin, supra note 107.
388. CalPERS board member and California state treasurer Philip Angelides made a public
statement on behalf of CalPERS requesting that the directors of CACI International, Inc. ("CACI"),
the site of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal investigation, "to 'get out of denial and hold company
executives accountable for any misconduct that has hurt both shareholders and the country."' Id.
CACI rejected Mr. Angelides's politically-motivated statement, stating that its shareholders are not
hurt because its stock price has risen by fifty percent in the past few months. Id.
389. Former CalPERS president John Harrigan has been accused of using his position in order to
support the cause of a strike by a union in which he is a senior executive. Carlton & Weil, supra
note 359.
390. Id.
391. The trustees entered into a contract with Ernst & Young that violated federal auditor-
independence rules. Jonathan Weil & Joann S. Lublin, TIAA-CREF Faces Question On
Governance-Fund's Brass Failed to Inform Key Panel About Improper Deal With Ernst, Its
Outside Auditor, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2004, at C1. Outside auditors are prohibited from forming
business ventures with audit clients. Carol Hymowitz, Management Missteps in '04 Hurt
Companies, Endangered Customers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2004, at B I.
392. Weil & Lublin, supra note 391.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Ms. Davis claims to be the "First Lady of Corporate Governance." Plitch, supra note 265,
para. 6. Ms. Davis appears to be the only opponent to the proposed rule who is not affiliated with a
corporation. See SUMMARY OF COMMENTS, supra note 54.
396. Plitch, supra note 265. "One cannot disenfranchise [ninety-five percent] of the shareholders
to benefit [five percent] of large institutional shareholders who wish to have their special interests
represented on Boards." Id.
989
that most institutional investors are short-term traders interested in selling
stock quickly in order to obtain a profit.3 97 Furthermore, an institutional
investor is not necessarily more representative of the interests of smaller
shareholders than the board of directors, who owe state-imposed fiduciary
duties to all investors.398
In boardrooms today, directors feel a "divine right to continue on the
Board without anybody challenging that assumption., 399 For years, directors
handpicked their fellow board members and their successors, often in
exchange for receiving invitations to serve on other companies' boards.4 °°
These directors often choose people who would not oppose their practices.
40 1
"Re-evaluating the way new directors are chosen is 'a rather key component
of corporate-governance reform.' 40 2 Although institutional investors may
have their own difficulties, the accusations they face are no different from
the accusations against boards of directors. Institutional investors' fortunes
are much more closely tied to the fortunes of other shareholders, as both
depend on the performance of the corporation in which they invest.
Directors, on the other hand, are often compensated regardless of
corporation performance.
J. Companies Are Sufficiently Responsive to Shareholders
Opponents of the proposed rule argue that companies themselves are
already correcting the corporate governance flaws that provide the
opportunity for corporate fraud.403 Companies have engaged in conduct that
has led to significant improvements in boardrooms. A study conducted in
July 2003 shows the results of such improvements: 404 (1) the boards of
397. Id. Under the current proposal, nominating shareholders are required to have held their stock
for one year. This may encourage institutional investors to buy stock for the purpose of placing a
candidate on the proxy statement, instead of investing in the long-term growth of the company.
Davis, supra note 350.
398. Karmel, supra note 99, at 14.
399. THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET, supra note 27 (quoting Richard Koppes, Of Counsel, Jones
Day).
400. Daniel Nasaw, Corporate Governance (A Special Report-Opening the Board: The Fight is
on to Determine who Will Guide the Selection of Directors in the Future, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27,
2003, at R8.
401. Id.
402. Id. (quoting Richard Koppes, Of Counsel at Jones Day).
403. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 81-82. Because institutional investors have come
to hold large blocks of shares, directors and managers are more "sensitive" and "responsive" to these
investors' views. Id. This responsiveness is due to the fact that if these institutional investors were
frustrated enough with a corporation to drop its shares, the sale would lead to a dramatic decline in
the corporation's stock price. Interview, supra note 28.
404. DETAILED COMMENTS OF BRT, supra note 35, at 32 (citing Press Release, The Business
Roundtable Corporate Governance Survey Highlights (July 15, 2003),
http://www.businessroundtable.org/document.cfm/969).
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directors of eight in ten companies were no less than 75% independent; (2)
the outside directors of 97% of companies meet once a year at a minimum;
(3) while only 44% of companies evaluated their directors in 2002, over
70% of companies did so in 2003; (4) 55% of companies had an independent
chairman or outside director; (5) 90% of companies promoted, necessitated,
or operated director education programs; and (6) the nominating committees
of 67% of companies operated a process which facilitated communication
with shareholders. °5
These steps reflect great improvements made to correct the flaws of
poor corporate governance, but shareholders, as owners of corporations,
must be provided a means of ensuring that directors will continue to perform
their duties correctly. 40 6 The proposed rule will operate as such a means of
checks and balances, and will enable investors to better understand and
evaluate the performance of the board. Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt
Jr. stated, "To foster greater accountability, the SEC also should pass its
current proposal to open up proxy access to shareholders and make directors
accountable for their actions. The SEC proposal.. . would prevent a free-
for-all of board nominations and management chaos. 'A4 7  The current
corporate governance environment needs "a little bit of a tweak to the
system to raise the level of accountability of directors, of individuals, to
shareholders. 40 8  Increased shareholder participation in the nomination
process is the most effective way to achieve this goal.40 9
K. Recently Enacted Corporate Governance Rules Must Be Given Time To
Be Effective
Those who oppose the proposed rule contend that the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 and the NYSE and NASDAQ corporate governance listing
standards have not been allowed sufficient time to be effectively evaluated;
they should be given the opportunity to be implemented before the SEC
enacts new rules.41° It is possible that the proposed rule attempts to correct
corporate governance concerns that have already been addressed by other
405. Id.
406. Interview, supra note 28.
407. Les Greenberg, Letter to the Editor, SEC Rules Won 't Improve Boards Gone Bad, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 6, 2004, at A15.
408. THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET, supra note 27 (quoting Ted White, Director of Corporate
Governance, CaIPERS).
409. Id.
410. Garris et al., supra note 24, at 26. The two Republican SEC Commissioners, Mr. Paul Atkins
and Ms. Cynthia Glassman, support this view. Solomon, supra note 17.
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means.4 11 In addition, the increased concentration of institutional investor
ownership in public companies has resulted in enhanced shareholder
communications with boards.4t 2
Although the recently adopted corporate governance rules provide a
means of policing fraud, those measures are "not enough," states former
Chairman Donaldson.1 3 These reforms cannot ensure that directors will act
independently, be responsive to shareholder concerns and contribute to
develop the long-term value of the corporation. 41 4  "Given the current
incumbent-controlled election process, shareholders have no . . . effective
means of holding directors accountable for failing" to perform their
responsibilities for which they were hired.41 5 By allowing shareholders the
opportunity to nominate directors in limited circumstances, the proposed
rule will encourage directors to act more in accordance with the standards
set forth by regulating bodies, and will lessen investors' reliance on
regulatory supervision to provide relief for wrongs committed.41 6
In addition, a majority of commentators acknowledged the importance
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the stock exchanges' amendments to
listing standards, but preferred the proposed rule as a means of addressing
such problems as conflicts of interest and director accountability. 417
VIII. WHY HAS THIS PROPOSAL NOT BEEN PASSED?
A. Public Reaction to Delayed Passage
Shareholder groups are beginning to worry about the long delay in the
passage of the proposed act.4 8  Ann Yerger, the Council of Institutional
411. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 69. Board members claim that they are
responding to the new laws and pressure, putting more effort and time into their job than they
previously had. Bums, supra note 6. "Boards are being much more diligent than they ever have
before," says Patrick McGurn, senior vice president and special counsel at Institutional Shareholder
Services, a proxy-advisory firm. Id.
412. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 91.
413. Solomon & Lublin, supra note 5. Like SEC Chairman Donaldson, Cato Institute Chairman
William Niskanen worries that shareholders and corporations will think that adhering to the
regulations set forth in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will be "enough." Sean Aylmer, Governed by Fear,
AUSTL. FIN. REv., Nov. 3, 2003, at 68. In Chairman Niskanen's opinion, "'Sarbanes-Oxley is
clearly necessary but it's partly harmful and clearly insufficient' . .. . [C]ompanies, investors and
bankers will think they are doing enough to meet community corporate governance standards by
following the new rules. But they need to do more." Id. (quoting William Niskanen).
414. Silvers & Garland, supra note 15 (manuscript at 6-7); see also Aylmer, supra note 413, at 68
(noting that "[w]hat the stock exchange and government has done is accept prescriptions of the
corporate reform movement without evidence, and that gives people a false sense of security that
something has happened .... [Sarbanes-Oxley] will have zero effect.").
415. Silvers & Garland, supra note 15 (manuscript at 7).
416. Id.
417. SUMMARY OF COMMENTS, supra note 54.
418. Bums, supra note 56.
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Investors's Deputy Director, fears that the proposed rule is "going to stall
and fall into oblivion,"4'9 as such measures have done so many times in the
past.4
20
Statements from SEC staff indicate that Chairman Donaldson was
subject to "immense political and industry pressure. ' 421
B. Political Pressure
1. Secretary of Treasury John Snow
The SEC has heard objections to the proposed rule from Treasury
Secretary John W. Snow.422 Mr. Snow was chairman of the Business
Roundtable, an "association of 157 CEOs from the U.S.'s largest
corporations4 23 and a staunch opponent of shareholder nomination access,
from 1994 to 1996.424
2. U.S. Chamber Of Commerce
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has urged the SEC to drop the
proposed rule.425 "The SEC should reject bad regulations that would allow
unions and narrow-interest groups to put special interests ahead of
419. Id. Currently, the proponents of the rule actively seek its passage because they are enraged
by the recent corporate crises and the lack of means to hold directors accountable for their actions.
Solomon & Lublin, supra note 5. The longer it takes for the proposed rule to be approved by the
SEC commissioners, the longer it will be before shareholders are able use the rule to nominate
candidates. See Solomon, supra note 17. The SEC may eventually decide that existing rules
sufficiently address corporate governance problems. See, e.g., Security Holder Director
Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,626, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206,
68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,785 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249,
274) (describing the events of 1977, during which the SEC decided not to adopt a similar proposed
rule because companies were voluntarily creating nominating committees).
420. Bums, supra note 56. The initiatives of 1942, 1977, 1980, and 1992, if proposed, were never
adopted by the SEC. STAFF REPORT, supra note 31.
421. Labaton, supra note 58. Mr. Snow may be able to exert extensive political pressure upon the
SEC commission if his objections are taken to be those of President Bush's administration.
CONGRESS WATCH, supra note 1, at 3.
422. Labaton, supra note 58. The exact objections that Mr. Snow has to the proposed rule were
not disclosed. See id. However, it can be inferred that Mr. Snow rejects the proposed rule for
reasons similar to other opponents: the SEC has no authority to implement such a rule, and the
operation of the proposed rule, if passed, would create chaos in the boardroom. See Solomon &
Schroeder, supra note 28.
423. See Solomon & Schroeder, supra note 28.
424. CONGRESS WATCH, supra note 1, at 3-4, 13.
425. U.S. Chamber Urges SEC to Drop Proposed Shareholder Access Rule, supra note 53.
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shareholder interests in the board room," stated Chamber Senior Vice
President David Hirschmann. 2 6 He continued, "[i]f the [SEC] proceeds
with this proposal, we will challenge it in court.
427
C. Division Among SEC Commissioners
Although the five SEC commissioners all voted both to propose the rule
and to request public comment, the two Republican commissioners
expressed "serious concern[]" about the rule's passage.428 In the face of this
criticism, former Chairman Donaldson, who had previously adamantly
backed the original proposal, considered a "watered-down" alternative.429
This compromise did not garner support, with the two Democratic
commissioners 430 favoring the original, tougher version of the proposed
rule,43  and Chairman Donaldson's fellow Republican commissioners
opposing even the lenient version.432
Chairman Donaldson's hesitance to move forward with the shareholder
access rule infuriated former Commissioner Goldschmid, who declared in an
October 2004 speech, "The [SEC's] inaction to this point has made it a safer
world for a small minority of lazy, inefficient, grossly overpaid and
wrongheaded CEOs. So far, in my view, the worst instincts of the CEO
community have triumphed.,
433
D. Response to Criticism: Alternative Proposals
Former Chairman Donaldson attempted to create "a compromise that
would appease the business community" as well as acquire majority support
426. Id. (internal quotations omitted). The Chamber believes that special interest directors will
weaken corporate boards. Id.
427. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
428. Solomon, supra note 17. Republican commissioners Paul Atkins and Cynthia Glassman
expressed concerns about the SEC's authority to implement the proposed rule and the triggering
requirements needed for its activation. Id. Commissioner Glassman stated that a withhold vote
trigger of more than fifty percent, as opposed to thirty-five percent, may be more appropriate. Id.
Commissioner Atkins would prefer the rule to apply "only to companies with proven problems."
Solomon & Lublin, supra note 5.
429. Deborah Solomon, Tough Tack of SEC Chief Could Relent, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2005, at
Cl.
430. The two Democratic commissioners at the time of the rule's proposal were Roel Campos and
Harvey Goldschmid. Solomon, supra note 17.
431. Democratic Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid stated, "[i]t's critically important that we
move ahead with an access approach that has integrity and will be effective." Solomon, supra note
59.
432. Id. More lenient versions that the SEC is considering include plans that require a board and
shareholders to reach an agreement on a director candidate, or the current proposal with adjusted
triggering events. Solomon, Compromise, supra note 61; Solomon, supra note 17.
433. CONGRESS WATCH, supra note 1, at 4.
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from his fellow commissioners.434 He considered an alternative plan that
would give nomination committees the option of replacing a director that
investors sought to remove through the voting process.4 35 Another option
would permit companies to omit the name of the shareholders' candidate
from the proxy ballot if the board and shareholders were able to agree upon
a replacement director.436 The SEC staff is also discussing the adjustment of
the triggering events; for example, increasing the withhold vote trigger from
thirty-five percent to fifty percent.437
Present Chairman Cox views the Internet as the ideal means of
increasing shareholder participation, whether through exchanging
information or waging a proxy fight.438  Although companies may not
currently use the Internet freely to post shareholder materials, 439 this may
change in the near future as a result of a rule proposed by the SEC on
December 8, 2005.440 This proposed rule would amend the proxy process by
allowing companies and shareholders to post proxy materials online, as long
as shareholders receive notice of the availability of materials from the
434. Solomon, supra note 59. Chairman Donaldson was a strong proponent of the rule when it
was initially proposed, but backed away in the face of the proposed rule's opposition from business
groups. Solomon, supra note 235. In early February 2005, he supported SEC staff in allowing three
companies to reject shareholder nomination proposals from proxy materials. Id.
435. Solomon, supra note 59. In such an instance, investors would not nominate candidates: the
process would remain in the hands of the nominating committee. See id. This compromise would
respond to opponents' concerns that investors are not qualified to choose director candidates. See
Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 67. The SEC's stated objective in proposing the rule would
be met because shareholders are still given an opportunity to contribute to the nomination process by
targeting a director for removal. See Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-48,626, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,784
(proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274).
436. Solomon, Compromise, supra note 61. This alternative rule is favored by the Business
Roundtable, which refers to it as "proposal for cure." Labaton, supra note 58. This compromise
would leave the nomination process in the hands of both the board and shareholders. See Solomon,
Compromise, supra note 61. It would appease opponents because the board, which is trained to
choose qualified director candidates, would contribute to the nomination process. See Lipton &
Rosenblum, supra note 16, at 67. The SEC's stated objective in proposing the rule would also be
met because shareholders are still given an opportunity to participate in the nomination process by
conferring with the board about a replacement director. See Security Holder Director Nominations,
68 Fed. Reg. at 60,784.
437. Solomon, Compromise, supra note 61. This compromise will answer opponents' concern
that the triggers will be tripped too frequently, as fifty percent is a high threshold. See DETAILED
COMMENTS OF BRT, supra note 35, at 27.
438. SEC's New Leader Shares His Views On Range ofIssues, supra note 61.
439. Plitch, supra note 152.
440. Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 34-52,926, Investment
Company Act Release No. 27,182, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,598, 74,598 (proposed Dec. 15, 2005) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274).
posting party and are able to access these materials at will. 44 1 While the
passage of this proposed rule would make waging a proxy fight a much less
burdensome process for shareholders because of the low cost of transmitting
information over the Internet, 442 a number of concerns must be addressed
before the public is assured that all shareholders have the ability to
participate meaningfully in the proxy process so that directors are held
accountable for their actions. Notably, it is unclear whether Internet use
among shareholders, especially elderly shareholders, is sufficiently
widespread so as to allow shareholders to access proxy materials easily.
443
A further concern is whether shareholders may find receiving materials in
electronic format more burdensome than receiving the same documents in
hard copy.4
IX. CONCLUSION
In reality, it is impossible to foresee the consequences of the proposed
rule if it were adopted, and "whether [it] will generate benefits in excess of
[its] costs."445 The proposed rule is the first of its kind to be implemented." 6
If the proposed rule is adopted, it can be expected that there will be
increased labor and expenses for courts and publicly held corporations. 447 If
unexpected, negative consequences arise from its passage, the SEC will use
its rule-making authority to manage the problem.
448
If the proposed rule is not adopted, however, institutional investors will
continue to be strong and influential figures in corporate governance
reform.449 States are not likely to pass laws similar to the SEC's proposed
441. Id.
442. Plitch, supra note 152.
443. Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, 70 Fed. Reg. at 74,600.
444. Id. Shareholders would have the burden of downloading and printing out proxy materials
that are transmitted electronically. Id. The proposed rule would require a company to provide a
paper copy of the proxy materials to a shareholder upon request; however, any other party
submitting materials online would not be required to provide requesting shareholders with a paper
copy. Id. at 74,599. This may limit the amount of information available to shareholders who do not
access or are unable to access the Internet.
445. Grundfest, supra note 55 (manuscript at 6).
446. Id.
447. Interview, supra note 28. Often, the increased litigation will be the result of corporations
challenging shareholder-nominated directors by stating that the director does not meet the
independence standards required by the rule. Id.
448. Id. Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes the SEC to impose
"proxy solicitation rules that are 'necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors."' BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 14 (quoting 15 U.S.C. 78n(a) (2000)). If the passage of
the proposed rule results in a consequence that negatively affects the investors so that they are not
adequately protected, the SEC will use its rule-making power granted by Section 14(a) to amend the
rule. Interview, supra note 28.
449. Interview, supra note 28.
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rule, because state legislatures generally pass laws in favor of
corporations. 5 °
At present, the SEC appears split on the rule.451 Regardless, the passage
of the proposed rule would represent one of the most significant reforms
made to the proxy solicitation process. 45 2 "The recent corporate governance
crisis highlighted the importance of good board performance, and reforming
corporate elections would improve the selection of directors and the
incentives they face," 453 preventing such scandals from occurring in the
future.454 Since "half of the American population is an owner of securities in
one form or another, directly or indirectly," involving shareholders in the
director nomination process, as recommended by the proposed rule, would
allow "democracy in corporations., 455  This increased democracy would
succeed in aligning the interests of the board of directors with the interests of
shareholders, and in restoring proper corporate governance to publicly held
corporations.
Rose A. Zukin 4
5 6
450. Id. States want to encourage companies to form in their jurisdictions. Id. States pass laws
that are pro-corporation because they want to encourage corporations to incorporate in their
jurisdiction, which leads to substantial employment opportunities and economic growth. Id. The
proposed rule is not pro-corporation, as evidenced by the majority of opponents who are affiliated
with corporations. See SUMMARY OF COMMENTS, supra note 54.
451. OLSON & MOLONEY, supra note 9, § 10.13.
452. Id.
453. Bebchuk, supra note 8, at 44.
454. Id.
455. Atkins, supra note 367 (quoting former Disney director Stanley P. Gold).
456. J.D. Candidate, Pepperdine University School of Law, 2006; B.A. in Economics, Brandeis
University, 2003. 1 thank my family for their love, guidance, and inspiration; without their
encouragement, this article would not have been possible. Special thanks to Professor Janet Kerr,
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